The Houthis: A force the world cannot ignore
The Houthis’s latest strikes on Red Sea shipping underscore not only their resilience, but also their evolution into an autonomous and rising regional power.

Yemen’s Houthis have resumed attacks on Red Sea shipping as Israel bombs infrastructure controlled by the group in Yemen. Despite setbacks to their key backer, Iran, US airstrikes against its weapons facilities, and ongoing negotiations over a Gaza ceasefire, the Houthis – bolstered by growing ties to Russia and China, the absence of a credible opposition at home, and a history of disrupting global commerce – remain a force the world cannot ignore.
Yemen’s Houthi movement claimed strikes against two vessels in the Red Sea – a critical maritime transport route – in early July. Within 48 hours the group targeted the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Magic Seas with drones, missiles and grenades – reportedly causing the vessel’s eventual sinking – and attacked the Greek-owned Eternity C on its journey north towards the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the Israeli military struck the Yemeni ports of Hodeida, Ras Isa and Salif, and the Ras Kanatib power plant. Israel also attacked the Galaxy Leader, a Houthi-controlled vessel that Israel claimed had been assisting the group to track potential shipping targets in the Red Sea.
These strikes mark yet another escalation in Yemen’s long-running conflict. The Houthis withstood a wave of US airstrikes between March and May, launched in retaliation for its attacks against American military assets and international shipping since November 2023. The US objectives – to eradicate the group, thereby pressuring Iran to return to the negotiating table on its nuclear programme – were far from met. President Trump abruptly announced a ceasefire in May after it became clear the Houthis would not be easily defeated or deterred. Although Iran did return to talks, Israel’s 12-day military campaign against the Islamic Republic in June and the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities dealt a blow to diplomatic efforts. This, along with slow progress towards a ceasefire in Gaza, has given the Houthis renewed zeal in resuming their maritime campaign.
This time, the movement’s activities serve two purposes. First, they remind Western and Israeli capitals of the leverage that the group holds, as ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas resume in Qatar. Second, they give Tehran a leg up in any future discussions with Washington – the Islamic Republic can offer to restrain the Houthis in exchange for more favourable terms. However, its ability to do this over the longer term is far from guaranteed, as the Houthis have emerged as a strong and resilient force that operates autonomously from Iran. They continue to capitalise on anti-US sentiment generated by the attacks on Yemen and Iran, and are drawing on new and expanding geopolitical alliances to further strengthen themselves in the face of Western aggression. They also retain the upper hand with precedent in disrupting global commerce and striking regional energy infrastructure – both of which would significantly damage US interests.
The Houthis as an independent rising power
The Houthi movement has evolved in tandem with major regional and global geopolitical shifts and is currently thriving. Increased support for the group due to its position on the Gaza conflict, the absence of a strong domestic opposition, and emerging partnerships with Russia and China have elevated it from the status of marginal rebel group to a significant force in regional and global affairs. Though Tehran’s declining influence – by virtue of the decimation of Hezbollah and Hamas – and a more aggressive US policy may appear to present obstacles to the group, the Houthis have proven themselves adaptable. This has ensured their survival and led to their growing influence. The latest uptick in strikes offers another opportunity for the group to pivot and entrench their position.
Iranian support has undeniably played a critical role in the group’s rise, at least since 2014; however, the Houthis have always pursued their own domestic agenda and the oft-used label “Iranian proxy” fails to recognise the group’s strength and autonomy. Houthi-Iranian cooperation is strongest where their objectives align, most notably in disrupting Western and Israeli interests in the region. However, the movement has become increasingly independent of Iran, establishing political, military, and financial structures that enable it to function outside of Tehran’s control.
Expanding alliances beyond Iran
Through, and separately from, Iran, the Houthis have tapped into widening anti-Western sentiment to establish new partnerships with Russia and China. These relationships have translated into support in international fora such as the UN and enabled the group to diversify their sources of weaponry beyond black-market trading and smuggling. The Houthis have reportedly received targeting data from Moscow to enhance their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and procured Chinese-made components for the manufacture of cruise and ballistic missiles in exchange for allowing Chinese ships safe passage, according to US intelligence reports. The extent of the Houthis’ weapons arsenal is unknown; however, US officials credit the group for its resourceful and innovative approach to weapons development.
Far from being weakened by Iran’s setbacks, the Houthis have gained from the shifting balance of power within the Axis of Resistance. They have become the leading external force through which Iran can pursue its objectives – a point of leverage in the Houthis’ favour. As a result, the Houthis benefit from a strengthened public image and higher standing among Iran’s partners, which they can use to further their objectives in Yemen.
The Gaza conflict presents a strategic opening
The Houthis’ evolution is most evident through the prism of the Israel–Hamas war. Their attacks on Israeli-linked targets, framed as acts of Palestinian solidarity, have bolstered support for the group among regional and domestic publics. Houthi attacks against shipping in both the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden – which numbered more than 100 between November 2023 and December 2024 – have negatively impacted the flow of global trade, increasing costs, risk, and transit times for shipping. The group’s anti-Israel position has resulted in a spike in recruitment and sparked large-scale demonstrations in their favour among Yemenis, many of whom do not share the Houthis’ vision for their country but do not dispute the rationale behind the attacks.
By leveraging global attention on Gaza, the Houthis have secured a propaganda victory, reinforcing their narrative of standing against Western and Israeli interests. Their proactive role in the conflict has also made them more difficult to isolate diplomatically. They have engaged officially and directly with Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, and other actors outside of formal peace talk processes, gaining a quasi-legitimacy that they previously lacked.
Western retaliation and Houthi resilience
The US, UK and France previously provided tactical, logistical, and intelligence support for the Saudi-led coalition’s attempts to quash the movement during Operations Decisive Storm (2015) and Restoring Hope (2015-present). This time, Western actors have intervened directly, with growing intensity. The US-led multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched in December 2023 with the aim of bolstering regional maritime security. In January 2024, Operation Poseidon Archer saw the US and UK striking targets inside Yemen. Both were seen as modest attempts at curtailing Houthi capabilities while avoiding provoking widespread violence. The return of Donald Trump to the White House saw a step change in this approach. His administration redesignated the Houthi movement as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), sanctioned seven key individuals, and launched a military intervention aimed at eradicating the group.
The group’s resilience in the face of the short-lived US campaign is testament to the fact that the Houthis remain a black hole for Western and Israeli governments; intelligence on the group is scant and the challenging terrain and use of unconventional military infrastructure makes effective bombing campaigns difficult. More importantly, the Houthis – and Iran – are cognisant of the fact that there is no US appetite for boots on the ground, and the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq show the limitations and risks involved in such efforts. This will encourage the movement to withstand and resist any air campaign – as they have successfully done before. Furthermore, the US and Israeli strikes on Yemen risk fuelling the Houthi anti-Western narrative and boosting domestic support for the group against foreign intervention.
Critically, the group has at its disposal two means of retaliation. The first is its ability to escalate its activities in the Red Sea, the resumption of which it has already commenced, resulting in further disruption to global commerce. Second is an option to hit Trump where it hurts – the oil price. There is a precedent for targeted Houthi strikes against regional energy infrastructure and such a move would test the true extent of US commitment to regional allies and their security. As a result, deterrence is difficult to achieve and while Western and Israeli military pressure may increase costs or temporarily slow operations for the Houthis, it is unlikely to fundamentally weaken them.
The absence of opposition
The Houthis’ position of strength is further supported by Yemen’s political vacuum. The country’s internationally recognised government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), is weak, divided and lacks local legitimacy. Even though the PLC was formed and designed to unite anti-Houthi elements and thereby weaken the group’s influence, it is hampered by its inability to address economic and humanitarian crises, unify the armed forces under the authority of its respective members, and resolve domestic political issues such as independence efforts by Hadrawmuht province and the Southern Transitional Council. In the absence of a serious, cohesive and empowered opposition, there is no local force with the ability to challenge the Houthi movement. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have shifted to diplomatic strategies over military ones, both eager to maintain détente with Iran and ensure regional stability. This means that the group is unlikely to be dislodged by regional players either.
A lasting geopolitical force
The Houthis have proven their resilience many times and this is yet another occasion where they will adapt. The group’s strength has been boosted by its narrative victory, expanded geopolitical reach, and the success of its disruptive activities. Ultimately, its objectives are domestic, and so long as Yemen remains politically fractured, the group will remain unchallenged and retain its grip on the country. The Houthis are not just an isolated insurgency – they are a permanent fixture in regional power dynamics, and they will continue to take advantage of changing local, regional and international circumstances to further their agenda.