The cost of control: Amman risks the stability it aims to protect

The bottom line

• The Jordanian government’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood has opened the door to wider crackdowns on dissent, further narrowing the space for political expression.
• The political balance in Jordan is growing more fragile, as tensions between the government and Islamist parliamentarians intensify and public frustration mounts – all of which threaten overall stability.
• The Gaza war has become a major source of discontent with government policy. As the conflict continues to intensify, silencing criticism is unlikely to quell public anger. Opposition is expected to increase, but in forms that are less visible and harder to monitor. Rising regional instability adds to Jordan’s internal challenges and could embolden radical opposition.

Towards the end of April, the Jordanian government officially banned the Muslim Brotherhood, the country’s oldest and most organised opposition group. Officials justified the move by citing a foiled plot allegedly linked to Brotherhood members that dates back to 2021 and has resulted in 16 arrests. As part of its response, the authorities have also banned demonstrations against Israel’s actions in Gaza since the October 7 2023 attacks; detained activists and journalists who participated in the protests – including the head of the Israeli Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement; and blocked the Middle East Eye news outlet.

The government’s actions, framed as necessary for national security, may be understandable in a region where threats can quickly materialise into violence. Yet the implications go far beyond counterterrorism. Domestically, they risk exacerbating political alienation and social fragmentation at a time when national unity is increasingly vital for the country’s stability. Abroad, they signal that Jordan is willing to suppress opposition, especially vocal critics of the war in Gaza. Tel Aviv can use this potential pressure point as leverage as it advances plans for West Bank annexation.

The Gaza war and collapse of Amman’s domestic balancing act

The war in Gaza has laid bare the limits of a domestic balancing act in Jordan. In its initial stages, the government sought to placate public anger by withdrawing its ambassador from Tel Aviv and issuing strong condemnations of Israeli actions. But these measures were interpreted as symbolic gestures and failed to manage public protests, particularly among citizens of Palestinian origin, who make up over half of Jordan’s population. Public frustration intensified when Jordan intercepted Iranian missiles targeting Israel in April, a move widely seen as aiding Israel’s defence. This added to longstanding points of national contention over the 1994 Jordan–Israel peace treaty and 2021 water for energy deal.

In tandem with growing anger over Gaza, public disillusionment with the political process has also deepened. Voter turnout in the 2024 parliamentary elections fell to around 30% – a historic low. This followed a government crackdown that included banning 25 political parties and removing more than 727,000 Jordanians from the electoral roll. Between October 2023 and March 2024 some 1,500 activists, students, and political opponents were arrested under vaguely defined “cybercrime” and “terrorism” laws. Rather than subduing dissent, these measures amplified frustration – and may have contributed to the environment in which the recently foiled sabotage plot emerged.

After the September 2024 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – which has taken a stance against the Gaza war – emerged as the largest bloc in parliament, with 31 of 138 seats. While the IAF claims independence from the Muslim Brotherhood, its legal status in Jordan remains uncertain. Since the Brotherhood ban, parliamentary debates have become increasingly divisive, with government officials and elected representatives trading allegations of treachery. If the widening rift is left unchecked – particularly if the IAF is dissolved – Jordan could face a parliamentary crisis precisely when a stable political structure and effective governance are most needed.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s influence extends far beyond politics. For decades, it has operated a network of mosques, charities, schools, and clinics that provide essential services to Jordanian citizens. By banning the movement, the state now assumes the responsibility for this social infrastructure – at a time when the spill over from the Gaza war and broader regional instability has negatively affected tourism, investment and economic growth. The government thereby risks exacerbating, rather than managing, public discontent.

A region in flux, rising external pressures

Jordan’s domestic tensions are occurring against a backdrop of heightened regional and international uncertainty. The rise of Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa – whose roots lie in political Islam – may embolden anti-monarchy elements in Jordan, encouraging radicalism and acts of sabotage. Meanwhile, the return to office of Donald Trump revives concerns in Amman mooted in his previous term. Media reports in 2021 linked the first Trump administration to an attempted palace coup in Jordan. His second presidency brings further unpredictability over US aid policy to Jordan as well as towards Palestine.

The risk of the conflict spilling over into Jordan is a very real one. An Israeli takeover of Gaza or annexation of the West Bank remain serious possibilities – and Amman has publicly warned that any attempt to expel Palestinians from Gaza, and particularly the West bank, could lead to war with Israel. Israel also continues to express intentions to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, which might prompt an Iranian response crossing over Jordanian airspace.

While the domestic tensions and broader context give Amman ample reason to remain on guard, it must be cautious and balance efforts to safeguard national security with efforts to preserve public confidence and political trust. In seeking to protect itself from chaos, Jordan risks deepening discontent – and undermining the very stability it aims to preserve.

Opposition doesn’t disappear – it adapts

Jordanian authorities have traditionally allowed a controlled space for opposition, particularly for groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, as a means of managing political pressure. The recent decision to impose an outright ban marks a sharp departure, one made even more consequential by the broader regional context. Crackdowns on protests, especially near symbolic sites like the Al-Husseini Mosque, suggest that the target of the government’s actions extends beyond political actors to public mobilisation itself. If this continues, the next battleground is likely to become the education system, particularly curricula covering political Islam and Palestine. In 2016, the government removed Islamic references and topics covering Palestinian resistance from school textbooks, sparking a public backlash. In the context of Israel’s war in Gaza, any further efforts to sanitise education will only renew tensions.

Jordan’s efforts to contain the Muslim Brotherhood and broader dissent risk forcing it underground. As the Brotherhood’s counterparts in Egypt have shown, the movement and other opposition groups like it do not disappear; they adapt, operating covertly and becoming harder to monitor. Jordan’s current path risks cultivating the very conditions that breed radicalisation: repression, disenfranchisement, and economic hardship. If political space continues to shrink or parliament is dissolved, the crisis will only deepen.