MENA Strategic Bulletin

Israel breaks Gaza ceasefire truce

Israel ended its two-month ceasefire with Hamas by launching a wave of airstrikes on Gaza in the early hours of Tuesday, March 18, killing over 400 Palestinians on the first day. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the assault was “just the beginning,” signalling a prolonged military campaign. Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that the renewed offensive was in response to Hamas’s refusal to release more hostages – something not stipulated in the ceasefire agreement. Israel has claimed the operation was a pre-emptive strike to prevent alleged Hamas attacks, though it has not provided evidence, while Hamas has denied the accusation.

The Trump administration publicly backed Israel’s military actions, initiated amid stalled negotiations over the second phase of the delicate ceasefire agreement, which included post-war governance plans for Gaza and Israeli withdrawal from the Strip. Israel had already been accused of violating ceasefire terms by restricting supplies into the enclave earlier in March and refusing to withdraw troops from Gaza as stipulated in the first phase.

Hamas retaliated by launching a rocket attack on Tel Aviv on Thursday March 20, demonstrating that although the group is severely weakened, it is still capable of inflicting damage on Israel. This raises concerns of a renewed, prolonged and intensified conflict. Israeli ground troops have since moved back into areas of Gaza, notably the Netzarim corridor, and expanded operations to Rafah.

Stakeholder and regional impact

Netanyahu’s large-scale aerial campaign and the reintroduction of ground troops into Gaza have exacerbated internal divisions within Israel. Public opposition to the renewed fighting is growing, as evidenced by recent street protests against Netanyahu and his government. Politically, Netanyahu’s move secures his position by appeasing far-right coalition members, who have threatened to resign if the war ends with Hamas still in power.  Netanyahu would lose their support and therefore risk a government collapse if he were to resume negotiations and withdraw from the Strip.  Prolonging the conflict helps Netanyahu avoid political accountability for the security failures that enabled Hamas’s October 7 attack, and also to distract from his own legal crises at home.

US backing for Israel’s decision to resume hostilities will strain relations with key regional allies, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which have emphasised their support for a two-state solution and an end to the war. Public sentiment across the Middle East remains overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian, with widespread outrage over the heavy civilian toll in Gaza. US failure to check Israel will complicate US foreign policy in the region, especially as the Trump administration resumes its “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, increasing sanctions and intensifying its bombing campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. While Gulf allies share a desire to see Iranian proxy forces degraded and a nuclear deal on the table, they will be concerned about suffering the consequences of Trump’s more forceful policy. In Gaza, the humanitarian crisis is deepening. Israel’s blockade of food and vital medicines and cuts to power supply are resulting in rising casualties.

What’s next?

Hamas will attempt to leverage Israel’s ground incursion to draw Israeli troops deeper into Gaza and inflict casualties in a bid to increase domestic pressure on Netanyahu’s government to withdraw. Domestic opposition to the war within Israel is likely to grow, but Netanyahu’s hardline stance, driven by political survival and the need to project strength, makes an immediate resolution unlikely. Hamas’s continued resistance further reduces the chances of de-escalation in the near term, although the group’s leverage has decreased in the face of Israel’s clear prioritisation of defeating Hamas over securing the return of hostages.

Arab governments will continue to work to salvage ceasefire negotiations, but the lack of a comprehensive security framework in Egypt’s post-war Gaza proposal remains a major challenge. It outlines a pathway to rebuilding Gaza but fails to address the issue of Hamas governance and long-term security. Without a resolution that ensures both Palestinian and Israeli security, humanitarian aid and long-term reconstruction will remain stalled.

US strikes on Houthis escalate as tensions with Iran deepen

The Trump administration has escalated military action against the Houthis in Yemen this week, launching large-scale air strikes throughout Houthi-controlled areas. The immediate objective is to compel the group to halt its attacks on international and US military shipping and Israel, however, Washington has made it clear that it holds Iran directly responsible for the Houthis’ operations:  “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences, and those consequences will be dire!” The US issued warnings and threats to Iran claiming they could face military retaliation if the Houthis do not cease their attacks. Iran responded by stating the Houthis are an independent movement.

The US military campaign against the Houthis follows Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejection of Trump’s proposal to reopen nuclear negotiations, as well as the Houthis’ recent threat to target Israeli shipping in the Red Sea in response to Israel’s blockade of aid to Gaza. This marks the largest military operation in the Middle East under Trump’s second administration. The dual-front US approach – military action in Yemen and intensified diplomatic pressure on Iran –  is intended to force Iran to the negotiating table. However, the Houthis, while armed and funded by Iran, have proven their autonomy and are unlikely to give up their newfound leverage in the Red Sea.

Stakeholder and regional impact

The US is directly targeting the Houthi movement as the last and most powerful remaining Iranian proxy, while simultaneously pursuing policies aimed at countering Iranian influence in “Axis of Resistance” home territories, particularly Syria and Lebanon.

In Syria, American military officials played a pivotal role in brokering a March 10 agreement between the newly formed Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The agreement aims to ease tensions and enable the Syrian government to consolidate control over critical northern energy resources. It also serves to prevent Iran and its proxies from reestablishing a military foothold in Syria or using the country as a weapons corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In Lebanon, the US is working to uphold the fragile November 2024 ceasefire agreement. A key initiative is bringing Lebanese and Israeli officials together to resolve long-standing disputes that have hindered full implementation of the truce. These include ensuring the complete demilitarisation of southern Lebanon, enhancing Lebanon’s internal security, and facilitating the withdrawal of Israeli troops. In an effort to reinforce Lebanon’s stability, the US State Department has approved an exception to the foreign aid freeze, allocating $95m to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

As for Iran, it is exercising caution to avoid provoking a US or Israeli strike at a time when it lacks the capacity to retaliate effectively, particularly after recent setbacks to its ballistic missile capabilities. Despite this cautious approach, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains firmly opposed to negotiations with Donald Trump, whom he deeply distrusts. As a result, Tehran is likely to adopt a wait-and-see strategy, minimizing actions that could escalate tensions.

A key variable in this equation is the Houthis. Trump has threatened to hold Iran accountable for their actions, using this as leverage to pressure Tehran. However, Iran’s influence over the group has its limits. In an effort to avoid becoming the primary target of US strikes, Tehran is publicly distancing itself from Houthi operations. In reality, though, the Houthis have grown increasingly independent, recognizing the strategic leverage they now wield. While Iran may advise them to de-escalate, the group’s actions are ultimately driven by their own agenda and expanding capabilities.

What’s next?

The effectiveness of the US military campaign against the Houthis remains in doubt. The group has withstood sustained airstrikes before and, with no prospect of US ground intervention, is likely to do so again. Attacks on Red Sea shipping and military assets will likely continue, drawing the US into an extended and costly conflict with no clear off-ramp.

Iran is unlikely to engage in nuclear negotiations unless sanctions are lifted – an outcome Trump is unwilling to consider. Seeing no path to a deal under his leadership, Tehran will bide its time, avoiding direct confrontation with the US while positioning itself for a more favourable geopolitical landscape.