MENA Strategic Bulletin

Israel deploys tanks in the West Bank

For the first time since the second intifada in 2002, Israeli tanks have entered Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nour Shams in the occupied West Bank, marking a significant escalation in military operations. The offensive, known as Operation Iron Wall, was launched on January 21 with the stated aim of dismantling militant infrastructure allegedly supported by Iran. However, the presence of tanks, combined with the displacement of 40,000 Palestinians, has raised concerns about whether this could signal a shift towards de facto annexation.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the operation in broad strategic terms, linking it to Israel’s wider efforts against Iranian influence in the region. Notably, he referred to the West Bank by its biblical name, Judea and Samaria. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, a key figure in the government, has openly stated that 2025 will be the year Israel asserts sovereignty over the West Bank. This comes as Israeli settlements – considered illegal under international law – continue to grow, with more than 700,000 settlers now living in the territory.

Regional and stakeholder impact

If annexation moves forward, the first major flashpoint will be Jordan. Amman has repeatedly warned that forced displacement from the West Bank would destabilise the kingdom – and with thousands already being displaced from West Bank, that risk is increasing. Jordan has made it clear that it will not take in refugees from the West Bank. Any further escalation will strain Israel–Jordan ties to the breaking point, threatening one of Israel’s oldest (if fragile) regional partnerships.

At the same time, Donald Trump has left the door open to annexation. Asked if he supports Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, Trump said “people like the idea”, without committing either way. Given his first-term record of controversially recognising Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Golan Heights as its sovereign territory, it appears unlikely that Trump would stand in the way of annexation.

What’s next?

From here, two paths are possible. Israel could withdraw its tanks once it achieves its military objectives, following a pattern familiar from past raids.

The other path is annexation itself – a slow burn into full sovereignty. Smotrich’s 2025 comments suggest that with the Palestinian Authority sidelined and settler activity increasing unchecked, Israel’s far-right sees an opportunity to finally redraw the map.

Either way, by sending tanks into Area A, territory that under the Oslo Accords should be fully under Palestinian rule, Israel has set a dangerous precedent, normalising deeper military control and potentially causing damaging knock-on effects for its relations with Jordan. By continuing to cross international red lines with its military actions, the risk is that Netanyahu’s government broadens the spread of the contagion of regional instability.

Syria hosts its national dialogue conference

On February 25, Syria’s National Dialogue Conference opened in Damascus, aiming to chart a new political and economic future after the December 8 ousting of Bashar Al Assad. The event, led by Syria’s new president, Ahmed Al Sharaa, who rose to power through Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) military takeover, focuses on transitional justice, constitutional reform and economic rebuilding. After more than  50 years of Ba’ath Party rule, it’s the first organised attempt to define a new polity for Syria.

Around 600 participants attended, representing different regions and factions, but significant absences undermined the conference’s claims of inclusivity and representation. Major Kurdish leaders, who govern roughly a third of Syria, were excluded.

Regional and stakeholder impact

The absence of Kurdish leaders, along with uncertainty over the role of the Druze community, casts a long shadow over the dialogue. Both groups hold significant territory and military strength, making their exclusion a major flaw in the process.

Elsewhere, criticism centred on the lack of transparency in the selection process for the invite-only conference, and the fact that it was announced a mere two days before taking place.

External pressures are also shaping the scene. Israel, concerned about the growing influence of HTS near its border, has warned it will not tolerate HTS forces in southern Syria and demanded the demilitarisation of Druze areas.

Within Syria’s Druze community, opinions remain divided over the country’s transitional process. While some leaders have signalled willingness to engage with Sharaa’s government, others have announced the formation of a coalition openly opposing the new leadership.

Meanwhile, Syria’s new leadership faces a tough diplomatic reality. It needs economic support from the US and Europe, both closely aligned with Israel. This leaves Damascus in a weak position to push back against Israeli demands, even if it raises the issue at the UN. Simply put, the new government’s survival depends on external aid that comes with strings attached.

What’s next?

Without Kurdish and Druze participation, the conference risks going down in history as a symbolic exercise rather than the foundation for a durable settlement. The absence of key power players means agreements struck in Damascus could collapse on the ground once implementation begins.

At the same time, the new leadership has a clear incentive to project legitimacy through this conference – both to unlock Western diplomatic engagement and to push for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions. Without sanctions relief, Syria’s economic collapse will deepen, undermining any chance for long-term stability – something Sharaa knows well.

Finally, tensions with Israel could escalate if HTS fighters remain near the border, further testing the fragile transition. Whether the new government can rebuild internal trust, engage excluded factions and win external legitimacy will define the success – or failure – of this transition period.

Lebanon’s new government wins vote of confidence

On February 26, Lebanon’s newly formed government led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam secured a vote of confidence in parliament, winning the backing of 95 out of 128 lawmakers. In a speech ahead of the vote, Salam laid out his top priorities, including kickstarting stalled negotiations with the IMF and working to remove Lebanon from the global financial grey list, a critical step towards restoring investor and donor confidence.

Salam also pledged to put ordinary depositors – who have been locked out of their bank accounts since the 2019 financial collapse – at the centre of economic recovery efforts. However, after years of failed reform attempts, many remain sceptical about how much this government can realistically deliver.

Regional and stakeholder impact

One of the most striking aspects of the new government’s policy statement is its omission of the language traditionally used to legitimise Hezbollah’s de facto role in Lebanon’s defence.

Still, Hezbollah opted to back Salam’s government, signalling it is not ready to fully confront the new political order – at least for now. In a speech on Tuesday, senior Hezbollah lawmaker Mohammed Raad confirmed the group’s support. The move reflects the group’s shift to a more pragmatic strategy as it looks to preserve what influence it can within the shifting political landscape.

For Lebanon’s Western backers – particularly the US and France – the new government is seen as a necessary step towards unlocking post-war reconstruction funds and unblocking IMF assistance. However, their support is contingent on concrete economic and financial reforms – reforms that successive governments have promised, but consistently failed to deliver.

What’s next?

The Salam government’s immediate challenge will be to restore trust – not just with international creditors, but with Lebanese citizens who have endured years of economic freefall, lost savings and political dysfunction. Negotiations with the IMF, expected to resume in March, will test whether this government can deliver reforms or simply recycle familiar promises.

Much will also depend on whether Lebanon can balance domestic political compromises – particularly with Hezbollah – against the economic and governance conditions demanded by the IMF and Western donors. The absence of Hezbollah-friendly language in the policy statement may be symbolic, but it also hints at a fragile power-sharing formula that could unravel quickly if the group feels pushed too far to the margins.

Ultimately, Salam’s government needs quick wins – removing Lebanon from the grey list, securing some form of IMF progress and offering concrete relief for depositors – if it is to maintain the confidence won in parliament. The longer these wins remain unrealised, the greater the risk it will become just another caretaker government, cycling through the same broken promises Lebanon has become all too familiar with.