MENA Strategic Bulletin

Jordan bans the Muslim Brotherhood

Jordan has officially outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, signalling the end of a decades-long balancing act between the monarchy and the region’s most influential Islamist movement. The ban, announced by Interior Minister Mazin Al-Farrayeh on Wednesday, comes just days after 16 individuals were arrested for allegedly plotting acts of sabotage, including manufacturing drones and rockets.

“The dissolved Muslim Brotherhood has tampered with national unity and disrupted public order,” read an Interior Ministry statement. All Brotherhood offices will be shuttered, and their assets seized. Membership and the promotion of the group’s ideology are now prohibited.

The timing of the announcement, during King Abdullah II’s visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is no coincidence. Jordan is falling into lockstep with regional allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain, all of which have declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. For Amman, this is more than ideological alignment; it’s a signal that the monarchy views the Brotherhood not as a political rival but as a direct national security threat.

Stakeholder and regional impact

The outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood marks a clean break with political orthodoxy in the Kingdom. For years, Jordan tolerated Brotherhood-aligned entities operating in a legal grey zone. That tolerance is over.

The Brotherhood’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front, has surged in popularity, winning 31 out of 138 seats in the most recent parliamentary elections and becoming the largest bloc. The party tapped into growing public anger over Gaza and rising discontent with the monarchy.

Like its allies, Jordan is keen to emphasise the security risks posed by Brotherhood activities. Intelligence officials recently intercepted weapons and drones tied to smuggling networks allegedly linked to the Brotherhood and other outlawed groups. That raised alarms about possible Iranian involvement, especially after Jordan intercepted Iranian missiles aimed at Israel earlier this year.

The crackdown also comes amid rising domestic pressure. Anti-monarchy sentiment has grown since King Abdullah’s meeting with Donald Trump to discuss post-war plans for Gaza. In February, the King warned military veterans of unnamed actors “taking orders from abroad”.

This isn’t unprecedented. Jordan’s monarchy has weathered serious internal threats before, from the 1970 Black September conflict with Palestinian factions to the attempted palace coup in 2021. This is the latest example of the monarchy acting decisively to reassert control.

What’s next?

Jordan’s move could set a wider precedent for clamping down on the Muslim Brotherhood’s political operations. But while the government frames the ban as a necessary security measure, the move risks triggering domestic instability.

Jordan is already grappling with the fallout from Trump’s foreign aid freeze and the knock-on effect of the war in Gaza. A crackdown of this magnitude risks provoking backlash, especially from Brotherhood sympathisers and communities facing mounting hardship.

Although the Islamic Action Front has vowed to continue as an independent political party, it is unclear how they will continue operating. Office raids and asset freezes for the Muslim Brotherhood offices have already begun.

The key question now is how the Brotherhood responds. The most likely options are political mobilisation, quiet reorganisation or confrontation. For Jordan, the stakes are high: press too hard and risk unrest; show leniency and risk losing control. Either way, the era of ambiguous tolerance is over. The monarchy has chosen confrontation over coexistence.

Egypt and China launch first-ever joint air drills

Egypt and China have kicked off their first-ever joint military air exercises, indicating a shift in Cairo’s defence strategy. The operation, titled Eagles of Civilization 2025, is being held in Egyptian airspace from mid-April through mid-May. Centred at the Wadi Abu Rish Air Base, approximately 100 kilometres from the Gulf of Suez and not far from the Israeli border, the drills involve tactical coordination between both air forces and mark a historic first for the two nations. China’s Ministry of National Defence called the exercise a major step forward in “pragmatic cooperation and trust-building” between the two militaries.

Stakeholder and regional impact

This joint drill sends a strategic message. Egypt is diversifying its defence partnerships at a time when regional actors are rethinking their dependencies on traditional security patrons and Washington’s reliability is increasingly brought into question.

This trend isn’t isolated. Countries like Indonesia are exploring similar shifts, deepening ties with Middle Eastern partners to hedge against shifts in US foreign policy and build autonomous security postures. Egypt, with its critical geographic location, the Suez Canal and a large domestic market, is an attractive defence partner for China.

China, for its part, is expanding its footprint in the Middle East and Africa, quietly positioning itself as an alternative power broker in a region where the US has long dominated. With American influence receding following massive foreign aid cuts and Trump’s unpredictable approach to diplomacy, Beijing is filling in the gaps.

Cairo’s motivations are layered. The $1.4 bn in annual US military aid has long been a point of leverage, but also a source of tension. Egypt’s refusal to take in displaced Palestinians from Gaza has only deepened a rift that is likely to widen during Trump’s presidency.

This development will also be closely watched by Israel. China’s presence in the area will increase previous concerns surrounding Egypt’s militarisation of the Sinai Peninsula, adding a new strategic layer to an already volatile neighbourhood.

What’s next?

For Cairo, the partnership with China is both a bargaining chip and a pressure valve. As US-Egypt ties continue to strain, especially over Gaza, Egypt is signalling it won’t be cornered by conditional aid or diplomatic coercion. The partnership with China offers not just military cooperation, but also economic promise in the form of increased trade and infrastructure deals.

This is also a testing ground for China’s growing ambitions in the region. As Washington grapples with competing priorities, Beijing is carving out space to manoeuvre militarily, diplomatically and economically.

Whether this drill is a one-off or the beginning of deeper defence collaboration remains to be seen. But this much is clear: Egypt is showing that it has options, and China is right there, ready to capitalise.

IMF reopens Syria mission for first time in 14 years

The International Monetary Fund has appointed a head of mission to Syria for the first time since the outbreak of civil war in 2011, showing a cautious but notable step towards reengaging with the new government. Economist Ron van Rooden will lead the IMF’s operations in Syria. The mission’s establishment coincides with Syria’s first participation in the IMF-World Bank spring meetings in two decades. During the meetings, Saudi Arabia co-hosted a roundtable focused on Syria’s reconstruction, showcasing regional interest in stabilising Syria’s economy.

Stakeholder and regional impact

Van Rooden’s appointment comes with a mandate to design a fully fledged support programme for Syria over the next two years. The programme will include a timeline for launching a grant-backed overhaul of the electricity sector within three months as well as broader efforts to improve public finance management, strengthen institutional transparency and lay the groundwork for economic recovery. Plans are also in place to advise on restructuring public institutions, modernising financial infrastructure, addressing poverty through expanded social safety nets and opening space for public-private partnerships.

Syria has not had a financial relationship with the IMF for over 40 years. The reappointment of a mission chief marks a significant step forward. The leadership of governing party Hay’at Tahrir al Sham is seeking not only reconstruction funds but also relief from international sanctions and a path to legitimacy.

The government is pushing forward with economic liberalisation plans. Efforts like the newly launched “Invest in Syria” initiative, which offers legal and logistical support to prospective investors, are aimed at attracting investment and making the country more accessible despite ongoing sanctions.

Support from outside institutions is also beginning to take shape. The United Nations Development Programme has pledged $1.3bn over the next three years to support Syria’s recovery. The IMF’s involvement adds institutional weight to that momentum and opens the door for deeper multilateral engagement, provided political conditions allow.

What’s next?

Despite the renewed engagement, Syria’s full reintegration into the global financial system remains a distant prospect. US sanctions imposed under Assad’s rule are still firmly in place, and although Washington issued a limited six-month humanitarian exemption in January, its impact has been minimal.

Nonetheless, the IMF’s re-entry into Syria could marks a turning point. It is an act of good faith on the part of a major international institution that will lend credibility to the new government, potentially serving to invite policy action domestically and increased investment interest internationally. However, whether the establishment of an IMF mission in Syria is the beginning of a long-term relationship will depend on the transitional government’s ability to distance itself from extremist affiliations and implement real reforms.