MENA Strategic Bulletin

Druze, Syrian and Israeli forces clash in week of deadly fighting

On July 17, Israel conducted airstrikes on Syria’s Defence Ministry in Damascus, marking the first Israeli attack on the capital since May. The strikes followed two consecutive days of Israeli operations targeting Syrian military units in the south, in direct response to Syrian army deployments near Druze-majority areas along the Israeli border. Israel views the area as strategically sensitive under the 1974 disengagement agreement and stated it would not allow Syrian forces to threaten the Druze community.

Over 250 people were reportedly killed in four days of clashes involving Syrian government troops, Druze militias and Bedouin tribes. The fighting, sparked by a local dispute, quickly escalated into a broader sectarian confrontation. Syrian tanks advanced into Suwayda as Druze spiritual leaders issued conflicting messages, some calling for resistance, others for ceasefire.

Israel’s intervention was not merely reactive, but also signalled a broader strategic intent to deter Damascus from reasserting control in a region where Israel seeks to project influence through its claimed role as protector of the Druze. Defence Minister Israel Katz described the strikes as a “clear warning”, insisting that Israeli forces would not allow harm to come to the Druze community. This statement was met with scepticism and even rejection by many Druze, who are wary of being drawn into regional power plays.

The situation in Suwayda remains volatile. One ceasefire announced on Tuesday quickly collapsed, while a second ceasefire announced on Wednesday has been undermined by reports of renewed fighting between Druze militants and Bedouin tribes. On Friday, the Syrian Ministry of Interior was forced to deny reports that it was redeploying its forces to Suwayda to quell the clashes.   

Stakeholder and regional impact

Israel

Israel’s intervention in Syria’s southern conflict has been framed as a protective measure for the Druze minority, a community with deep ties to Israel’s own Druze citizens and historic roots in the occupied Golan Heights. However, Israel’s airstrikes on Damascus and the Syrian south indicate the strategic interests behind its rhetoric of safeguarding minorities. By targeting the Defence Ministry in the capital and moving forces into the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and the demilitarised buffer zone, Israel continued a trend of directly challenging the terms of the 1974 disengagement agreement. Israel’s response risks undermining efforts at conciliation between Syria and Israel. Just last week, Saudi and Syrian activists were in the Knesset discussing a path for normalisation while the UAE hosted backchannel talks between Syrian and Israeli officials. It also risks undermining the newly established Israeli–Turkish deconfliction mechanism mediated by Azerbaijan.

Israel’s engagement also risks further inflaming tensions within Syria. Many Druze reject Israeli influence, fearing association with a foreign power that could see them labelled as collaborators. The tearing down of Israeli flags in Suwayda indicates the complexity of Druze sentiments. By intervening on behalf of the Druze, Israel risks inflaming tensions with other sects, especially Sunni communities.

Syria

For the government in Damascus, led by Ahmed Al Sharaa, the unrest in Suwayda presents both a political challenge and an opportunity to assert control over a province with a history of de facto self-rule. The entry of Syrian forces into Suwayda followed a calculated decision to exploit intercommunal tensions between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes and cast the new government as a stabilising force. However, the operation has exposed the limitations of Damascus’s authority.

The Syrian military’s heavy-handed approach, including selective disarmament that targeted Druze factions while ignoring Bedouin militias, has only deepened local distrust. The backlash from influential Druze spiritual leaders, particularly Sheikh Hikmat Al Hijri, who rejected the ceasefire and denounced the state as “armed gangs”, highlights Damascus’s deteriorating credibility among minorities.

While the government has made pragmatic moves, such as appointing Druze officials and engaging in negotiations with figures like Laith Al Balous, these gestures have not translated into trust or durable stability.

Moreover, Israel’s strikes have further complicated Damascus’s position. The symbolic and strategic blow of an attack on the Defence Ministry underscored Syria’s vulnerability and the scant protection provided by its improved relations with Washington.

With Israel now flexing its military superiority in the south, Sharaa’s strategy of managing resistance through attrition and short-lived truces appears increasingly limited. Any gains in nationalist support from resisting Israeli aggression may be offset by the perception that the state cannot deliver lasting security or autonomy.

United States

Israel’s strikes on Damascus will have important implications for Syria-Israel normalisation talks, which Trump has publicly backed. Following the Israeli strikes, the State Department announced its disapproval, emphasising that Washington had not sanctioned the attacks.

Behind the scenes, US officials scrambled to de-escalate the situation. Special envoy Tom Barrack had multiple calls with Israeli officials, urging them to halt military operations and instead pursue direct negotiations with Damascus.

Washington’s dilemma lies in balancing its alliance with Israel against growing regional instability. The Suwayda crisis highlights Netanyahu’s willingness to undermine Washington’s strategic goals in pursuit of his own agenda. This could prove harmful to his relations with the US President, with knock-on effects for Trump’s mooted Gaza ceasefire.

What’s next?

The escalation in Suwayda has exposed the fragility of Syria’s internal cohesion and the limits of external influence. While Damascus seeks to regain control, its reliance on force and failure to address minority grievances risk further fragmentation. Israel’s intervention, framed as Druze protection, is a strategic move to contain threats near its border, but is missing a long-term strategy: the effect may be to deepen sectarian divides and undermine long-term stability, derail talks of normalisation with Syria and harm US-Israeli relations.

Jordan implements widespread arrest campaign 

The past week has seen the Jordanian government launch one of the largest internal security campaigns in decades, targeting political opposition figures, civil society activists and members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood. The effort, led by the General Intelligence Department (GID), has included widespread arrests and interrogations, with many individuals detained without formal charges or legal representation.

The Brotherhood was officially banned in April, after authorities accused a group of affiliated individuals of manufacturing rockets and drones intended for use in the occupied West Bank. Sixteen people were arrested in connection with the case, and a media gag order was issued to limit public discussion.

While the crackdown is officially being framed as originating in national security concerns, its scope has gone far beyond Islamist political groups. Since the 12-day war between Israel and Hamas, the government has increasingly targeted Jordanians who voice criticism of Jordan’s perceived alignment with Israel. This includes the existing gas agreement between Jordan and Israel, and opposition to Jordan’s interception of Iranian missiles fired at Israel, a decision that sparked widespread public backlash, especially among political activists and citizens who view the conflict through the lens of regional resistance.

Multiple detainees have confirmed that interrogations centred on expressions of solidarity with Gaza, particularly donations, protests and public statements. Individuals were warned not to speak about their detention or its cause, with some subjected to multi-day questioning.

High-profile arrests included Ahmed Al Zarqan, a senior Brotherhood figure and former mayor; Khaled Al Juhani, an IAF-affiliated parliamentarian; and civil activist Hamza Bani Issa, whose family says he sustained injuries during detention. Most have not been formally charged or allowed access to lawyers.

The scale and secrecy of the campaign have drawn comparisons to the pre-1989 era, when emergency laws were used to suppress political dissent. In response, small protests and sit-ins have emerged in cities such as Tafilah, where tribal leaders have publicly demanded the release of detained community members. Rights observers warn that the crackdown risks conflating national security with legitimate political expression, particularly at a time of heightened regional tensions.

Stakeholder and regional impact

Jordan’s ongoing crackdown reflects broader shifts in its regional alliances, particularly its increased alignment with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel when it comes to opposing political Islam and suppressing public expressions of solidarity with Palestinian resistance.

According to sources cited in the arrest campaign, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have played a behind-the-scenes role, encouraging Amman to take stronger action against Islamist groups and civil activists, with the expectation of financial support in return.

Critically, the campaign has expanded beyond formal Islamist organizations. Hundreds of ordinary citizens, many unaffiliated with political groups, have been detained or interrogated for voicing opposition to the government’s stance on the ongoing Gaza war.

The Jordanian government appears to be using the regional crackdown on political Islam, especially following normalisation between Gulf states and Israel, as political cover to suppress internal dissent more broadly. The warnings against publicly discussing the arrests and opaque legal processes have the effect of weakening civic mobilisation and eroding what space remains for legitimate political opposition.

At the same time, these moves risk alienating key segments of Jordan’s society. Many detainees are from politically active families or tribal communities, and their arrests have triggered public frustration. In cities like Tafilah and Karak, tribal leaders have staged sit-ins to demand accountability. The perceived overreach by the intelligence services could carry longer-term political costs; Jordan’s tribes hold significant social influence, and any tensions with members of local tribes risk increased fragmentation and potential clashes with government forces.

What’s next?

Looking ahead, Jordan faces a delicate balancing act. Pressure from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel to suppress political Islam and dissent will likely continue, driven by regional security concerns and financial incentives. However, ongoing arrests without due process risk fuelling domestic resentment and undermining stability, especially in relations with tribal groups.