MENA Strategic Bulletin –Special Edition: Israel–Iran

Israel’s strike on Iran, decapitating the Iranian command structure before it could mobilise, has sent shockwaves around the region

Analysis

June 20, 2025 - 6 minute read

On June 13 Israel launched a major strike on Iranian territory, targeting what it described as the “heart” of Iran’s nuclear programme. The mission decapitated Iran’s command structure before it could mobilise. Among the dead were three of the most senior architects of the Islamic Republic’s military apparatus: Hossein Salami, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander-in-chief; General Mohammad Bagheri, Iran’s top military strategist; and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force and overseer of Iran’s ballistic missile programme.  

Israeli jets reduced radar sites, missile batteries and command posts to smouldering debris. Over the course of the last few days, Israeli strikes were able to hit multiple sites central to Iran’s nuclear programme, including Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan.  

Iran’s retaliation, while dramatic, has thus far lacked the same effectiveness or clarity. Launching roughly 100 drones and missiles on the first day, many carrying decoys and countermeasures, Iran managed to bypass some of Israel’s air defences and strike central targets in Tel Aviv. The Kirya military headquarters was hit, though the damage was limited. Iran also claimed to have struck a Mossad operations centre and a military intelligence node.  

But unlike Israel’s precision decapitation strikes, Iran’s targets were scattered and largely symbolic. The Israeli Defence Forces reported interception rates of 80-90% across its multifaceted defence layers, namely the Iron Dome, Arrow and David’s Sling. 

Nonetheless, the consistency of Iranian missile strikes over the past week has raised concern in Israel, particularly regarding the sustainability of its interceptor systems. Reports suggest that stockpiles are running critically low, especially for the Arrow system. Israel’s multilayered air defence network could risk becoming increasingly strained in the face of persistent Iranian attacks and its substantial ballistic missile arsenal.  

As a result of the exchanges, shockwaves are already rippling through global markets. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly a quarter of the world’s oil supply flows, most notably from the Gulf. Any disruption to this vital artery will rock global energy markets. Brent crude has already surged over 10%, reaching $78 per barrel, the highest level since January. Analysts warn that prices could spike to $120 per barrel if Iran intensifies hostilities or moves to block the Strait. Iran, which exports approximately 2.2m barrels per day, has used the threat of closure of the Strait to deter the US from joining the Israeli campaign.  

For the United States, increased oil prices could trigger a serious economic fallout. With inflationary pressures already straining households and a national debt exceeding $34trn, a new oil shock could tip the economy into stagnation. Despite President Trump’s current restraint toward military engagement, sustained economic pain at home could force a policy shift, forcing him to intervene. Israel took a big risk striking Iran, with potential for far-reaching ripple effects and regional spillover.  

Stakeholder and regional impact  

Domestic fronts: Iran and Israel 

Amid talk that Israel’s campaign may catalyse regime change in Tehran, Iranian opposition remains geographically scattered and politically uncoordinated. Evidence of vocal dissatisfaction with the regime came just two days before the Israeli strike, when President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Ilam was met with open defiance: protesters flooded the streets, denouncing him as a “mercenary of the mullahs” and calling for the downfall of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.  

Meanwhile, Iranian opposition figure Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah, has openly supported Israeli strikes and attempted to capitalise on them by calling for a nationwide uprising, but the fractured nature of Iran’s dissident landscape undermines any serious momentum toward regime change.  

Divisions run deep: some back Pahlavi’s appeals, while others have condemned the Israeli assault as opportunistic and destabilising. Activists like Mehdi Aminzadeh and Fatemeh Haghighatjou warn that foreign military action risks delegitimising the domestic struggle, and many remain deeply sceptical of Israeli intentions.  

What Israel may hope to trigger, a popular revolt from within, is unlikely to materialise in the near term. Years of brutal crackdowns, economic hardship and social fragmentation have weakened the regime’s legitimacy but also exhausted the public’s ability to organise effectively. 

Domestically, the war appears to have bought Netanyahu some time. Just days before the Israeli attack, Netanyahu’s coalition teetered on the verge of collapse amid growing public fury over corruption trials and October 7 intelligence failures. According to a Haaretz survey last month, 40% of Israelis were contemplating emigration. Since the onset of the conflict with Iran, opposition figures like Yair Lapid have suspended criticism in the name of national unity. The government is taking no chances on emigration however, ordering airlines not to allow citizens to leave the country, even on repatriation flights.  

Israel has imposed an even stricter shutdown in the West Bank, announcing a full military lockdown, erecting barriers, sealing roads and closing the King Hussein Bridge to Jordan. In Jerusalem, Israeli forces cleared worshippers from the Al-Aqsa Mosque under “emergency” measures amid Iranian retaliatory strikes. 

For Netanyahu, war with Iran is an opportunity to favourably distract and unite his many critics, whether in the international community, the US senate and administration or his ultra-orthodox cabinet. It’s a familiar ruse from Netanyahu’s political playbook: using war – whether in Gaza, Lebanon or now Iran – to reframe crisis as leadership. For now, it’s working. 

 Iranian proxies  

Since Israel’s military campaign following the October 7 attacks, Iranian proxies across the region have suffered significant setbacks, altering the regional balance of power. Given the shared border with Lebanon, Hezbollah had been one of the biggest threats to Israeli security, but its neutralisation created the opportunity to strike Iran without fear of reprisal.  

Lebanon’s leadership, facing immense economic devastation and widespread public opposition to war, has explicitly urged Hezbollah to show restraint. Both President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have warned against entangling the country in another devastating conflict as it struggles to recover from over $11bn in damage. Meanwhile in Iraq, elements of the Popular Mobilisation Forces have held pro-Iran rallies but have so far avoided escalation toward Israel.  

The Houthis in Yemen appear to be the most active of Tehran’s proxies, claiming ballistic missile attacks on central Israel’s Jaffa, and for the first time openly acknowledging coordination with Iran.  

However, even this theatre is marked by caution: the Houthis are balancing their alignment with Tehran against the risk of Israeli retaliation, which could jeopardise their hold on power in northern Yemen. On June 10, Israeli naval forces carried out strikes on Houthi targets in Hodeidah and reportedly attempted to assassinate Houthi Chief of Staff Mohammed Al Ghamari. These operations indicate a pattern of Israel seeking to contain retaliatory threats before they can fully materialise. Nonetheless, there is every chance of seeing further Houthi involvement in Iran’s retaliatory efforts, including the targeting of Red Sea ships. 

 Regional actors: GCC, Jordan, Egypt  

Across the Gulf and the wider Middle East, regional actors are increasingly alarmed by the prospect of further escalation. The GCC held an emergency meeting on June 15, condemning Israel’s strikes on Iranian territory and warning of the catastrophic consequences of attacks near nuclear facilities. The GCC emphasised the need for de-escalation, urging the resumption of nuclear diplomacy through Omani mediation and calling on the UN to act decisively. In Bahrain, authorities activated emergency protocols, testing air raid sirens and preparing over 30 shelters in anticipation of potential fallout. 

For the GCC, it is imperative to consider the environmental damage that Israeli strikes on Iran could cause, particularly in relation to the Bushehr nuclear facility. Bushehr remains a central concern for Gulf states, located roughly 180 miles from Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. The facility also sits perilously close to key desalination infrastructure. These plants provide up to 90% of the region’s drinking water.  

In March, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Al Thani warned in an interview with Tucker Carlson that if Bushehr were attacked, “The water would be entirely contaminated… No water, no fish, nothing—it has no life.” Reflecting such fears, Gulf media outlets have begun publishing civil defence instructions on radiation exposure. 

In Jordan, the war threatens domestic energy security. As part of a Jordan-Israel gas deal signed in 2016, Jordan relies on Israeli gas for approximately 40% of its national energy supply. Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen announced last week that gas exports to Jordan and Egypt would be suspended to conserve domestic supply amid wartime uncertainty. “They can see that we are in a war. I don’t want to use our strategic storage,” Cohen said. This disruption is already being felt in Egypt, where Israeli gas accounts for 15-20% of consumption, leading fertiliser producers to halt production on June 14.  

Politically, Amman has responded carefully, seeking to balance diplomatic relations with Israel and Iran while appeasing domestic anti-Israel sentiment. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi condemned what he called a “blatant violation of international law” during a phone call with his Iranian counterpart but also made clear that Jordan would defend its airspace from any side attempting to drag it into war. King Abdullah II reinforced this neutral posture in a speech to the European Parliament: “There is no telling where the boundaries of this battleground will end… the attacks on Iran threaten a dangerous escalation in our region and beyond.”  

Some of Iran’s retaliatory missiles have been intercepted by Jordanian air defence. Although controversial with large portions of the Jordanian public, who see these interceptions as actively aiding Israel, the government is framing them as acts to protect sovereignty. Jordanian media, most notably pro-government outlets like al-Rai, have pushed a narrative of Israel and Iran advancing “sectarian, apocalyptic agendas” that endanger the region’s secular order. 

 What’s next?

As long as Israel and Iran continue to exchange a series of direct strikes against each other, the region stands on the edge of a potentially irreversible transformation. Despite internal unrest and widespread public resentment, the Iranian regime remains resilient, both in terms of weapon stockpiles and the absence of a credible alternative to the current regime. 

Regionally, there is no appetite for escalation. Gulf states are alarmed by the risk of nuclear fallout, energy disruption and economic shock that a full-scale war would unleash. The Gulf’s ability to influence US policy, especially with their relationship with Trump, may be one of the last remaining levers to prevent broader conflict and US involvement. 

Washington will play a pivotal role in determining how the Iran-Israel conflict develops. President Trump’s remarks that, “I may do it; I may not do it. Nobody knows what I’m going to do”, reflects his long-held belief that unpredictability enhances US leverage.  

While he continues to brand himself as a “president for peace,” he may be tempted by the rare opportunity to deal Iran a decisive blow. But Trump will want to avoid committing the US to the Middle East and drawing comparisons with previous ill-fated US military interventions in the region. US intelligence reports indicate that Iran is already preparing retaliatory options targeting American assets in the region should Washington decide to intervene. 

 

Kanz Majdalawi

Kanz Majdalawi