MENA Strategic Bulletin – Special Edition: The overthrow of Assad

The state of play in Syria

On December 8, 2024, the Assad regime collapsed following a swift ten-day offensive by opposition forces. Led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with support from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), the offensive began with the capture of Aleppo on November 30. Within days, opposition forces had pushed through Homs and ultimately seized Damascus.

This rapid campaign forced President Assad to flee to Moscow, marking the end of 54 years of Assad family rule. During the offensive, opposition groups released regime prisoners while securing significant territory. Assad’s longstanding allies – Russia, Iran and Hezbollah – provided minimal support to the state’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA), hastening the regime’s collapse.

A temporary HTS-led government is expected to remain in place until March 2025, but Syria remains deeply fragmented, with numerous factions vying for influence. HTS’s military successes were achieved with the backing of Turkey, which has its own priorities. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control northeastern Syria and continue to pursue autonomy while clashing with Arab tribes. Meanwhile, remnants of the Islamic State have leveraged the chaos to stage a limited resurgence, carrying out small-scale operations. This patchwork of competing interests is one of the new leadership’s biggest challenges, complicating efforts to establish stable governance.

Compounding these challenges is the growing wave of returning refugees, with over 100,000 Syrian asylum applications placed on hold in countries across Europe and other countries like Turkey encouraging the return of refugees. This influx may place increasing strain on a country already suffering from internal displacement, a shattered economy and fragile relations with regional neighbours.

Stakeholders and regional actors in post-Assad Syria

 Iran

The fall of the Assad regime is Iran’s most significant geopolitical setback in decades, severing a key link in its “Axis of Resistance” and disrupting the military supply chain to Hezbollah. In response, Iran is likely to double down on its remaining proxies in Iraq and Yemen. This will prompt a sharp increase in Iran’s military and defence budget, alongside a stronger focus on expanding its arms and nuclear capabilities to restore strategic leverage and counter the growing Israeli threat.

Russia

While the fall of the Assad regime is a major setback, Russia’s influence in Syria remains partially salvageable. Moscow’s primary objective now will be to maintain its military presence, particularly at its naval base in Tartus, and to secure its remaining strategic interests with the HTS government.

Turkey

The collapse of Assad’s government provides Turkey with a strategic opportunity to realise its aims in northern Syria, particularly in countering Kurdish autonomy movements. Through proxies such as the SNA, Turkey is poised to solidify its control over key areas while actively working to undermine Kurdish-led efforts for self-governance. Additionally, its alliance with HTS further enhances Turkey’s position, creating opportunities for broader regional influence.

Israel

For Israel, this situation presents multiple opportunities. First, it allows Israel to secure its grip on the Golan Heights, a strategically valuable and long-disputed territory. Second, it provides a chance to consolidate its advantage over Iran. With Iran’s regional influence at a low point, Israel is likely to intensify efforts to assert dominance and prevent encroachment on its strategic interests.

The rise of an HTS-led Sunni Salafi government in Syria introduces a new ideological and security challenge for Israel. In response, the IDF has intensified its operations on Syrian territory, targeting military assets following Assad’s overthrow. According to the IDF, over 350 strikes have been conducted, reportedly destroying 70-80% of Syria’s strategic military infrastructure from Damascus to Latakia. These actions, in combination with its first ground invasion on Syrian territory in 50 years, served to send a clear message to the incoming HTS government that any threat to Israel’s security will be met with decisive military action.

United States

The US stance on Syria remains uncertain and is likely to be shaped by the next administration. The US is expected to prioritise protecting the Golan Heights, safeguarding Israeli interests and securing oil fields in northeastern Syria. Given President-elect Trump’s past stance, the US is unlikely to majorly support the SDF or Kurdish aspirations.

While direct involvement in Syria’s governance is unlikely, monitoring HTS and extremist movements will remain a key focus. The US currently has no plans to lift economic sanctions, a key factor in Syria’s post-Assad reconstruction. Although the Biden administration has indicated that some sanctions could be eased if the new government can respect minority rights, facilitate humanitarian assistance and quell terrorism, the parameters are likely to shift again when Trump enters office.

Internal dynamics in Syria

HTS has taken control of key governance roles, filling critical positions with its own members. While its economic policies appear to favour neoclassical principles open to free trade and an active private sector, it lacks clarity on how it will govern inclusively. In Idlib, HTS demonstrated a tendency to favour private sector-led recovery, and similar dynamics may emerge on a national scale. Although the same pre-2011 business networks may not reappear, key figures aligned with HTS are likely to dominate.

HTS leader Abu Mohammad Al Jolani has announced a general amnesty to all conscripted military personnel, one of several gestures towards reconciliation. However, so long as there is an absence of meaningful transitional justice mechanisms, the risk of continued violence and extra-judicial revenge killings will continue. This would exacerbate divisions and undermine efforts to create a stable new state.

Amid the political uncertainty, grassroots civic and social initiatives have emerged across Syria. Recycling programmes, street-cleaning campaigns and small-scale restoration projects are signs of hope and mutual coexistence among Syrians. These initiatives, along with the potential development of trade unions and social movements, could play a crucial role in Syria’s recovery, depending on how HTS approaches civil society engagement.

What’s next?

Questions remain around whether HTS has the capacity to govern Syria effectively, with the role of international stakeholders likely to be crucial. Turkey’s interventions through proxy forces like the SNA will seek to undermine Kurdish aspirations, adding to the instability in the country’s north-east. The West, particularly the US, will closely monitor HTS’s governance before considering any diplomatic engagement. Meanwhile, Qatar, one of the first countries to reopen its embassy in Damascus, is emerging as a potential mediator.

HTS is likely to continue to seek international recognition, as evident in its remarks about respecting minority rights and efforts to position itself as the popular force representing the Syrian people. The new government faces the delicate challenge of balancing the need to avoid endorsing a narrative of revenge while ensuring that victims of the regime feel a sense of justice. Mismanaging this balance could undermine its credibility and significantly hinder prospects for rebuilding stability in Syria.

Whether HTS can successfully appease these competing forces while rising to an enormous governance challenge will be decisive in ending Syria’s economic and political isolation.