1 To Watch
The Houthis have won the Red Sea
International commerce and Western navies have been forced to accept a new normal, and there are few signs of change coming soon.
October 1, 2024
Will Washington’s GCC allies be expected to pick a side?
Note: This edition of 3 To watch was distributed in full on October 12.
The UAE hovers between controlled competition with Beijing in East Africa and full engagement in the BRI, not only operating ports in China and along the String of Pearls network but bowing to Beijing’s prevalence in ports investments in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean region.
Abu Dhabi views Chinese connectivity projects as more viable than multinational ones (see INSTC), and in 2019 it invited COSCO Shipping Ports to manage Khalifa Port. In turn, China has been strategically savvy in navigating Middle East politics, for example by investing in Lebanon’s Tripoli port to service the reconstruction of Syria and Iraq rather than focusing solely on its Bay Port project in Israel.
Nonetheless, Western appetite to finance infrastructure projects in developing countries is likely to strengthen middle powers like the UAE, which have carved out a role as an alternative financial backer of logistics investments. France, Germany, Japan, India, the UAE – and even Turkey – could strengthen partnerships outside the US umbrella in a multipolar rejection of a renewed ‘Cold War’ in development finance.
Although closer to China’s opaque model of state capitalism, the UAE may also benefit from partnering in EU-backed initiatives that promote the federation’s knowledge-based rebranding.
1 To Watch
International commerce and Western navies have been forced to accept a new normal, and there are few signs of change coming soon.
October 1, 2024
1 To Watch
Hezbollah continues to attack Israel, but war in Lebanon is never worth it
July 24, 2024
1 To Watch
February’s disaster has renewed international scrutiny of the safety of Turkey’s dams and the risks they pose to downstream states.
March 29, 2023
© Azure Strategy 2024.