Trump’s nuclear opportunity in the Middle East

By Nour Eid, Guest Contributor

The bottom line

• Israel’s dismantling of Iranian proxies and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria have severely weakened Tehran’s regional influence and deterrence capabilities. Its nuclear programme is now its last major leverage.
• The current geopolitical climate provides US President Donald Trump with an historic opportunity to negotiate a much tougher nuclear deal (JCPOA 2.0) with Iran that could include its regional activities as well as its ballistic missile programme, provided that reasonable expectations are set – which means Iran retaining some in-house uranium enrichment.
• Trump could also push for a bilateral nuclear agreement between Tehran and Riyadh, building on the China-brokered détente to lay the groundwork for a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

Iran’s ability to project regional influence through its network of proxies is greatly diminished following a series of major blows that culminated in the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024. The “axis of resistance” has faced major setbacks: Hezbollah’s leadership has been eliminated, its operational capabilities diminished, and with Assad now in Moscow, Iran has lost strategic depth in Syria, rendering the supply of weapons to Hezbollah more difficult. Iran’s willingness to remain invested in the Lebanese militia, and its proxies at large, is therefore called into question. Even if Tehran seeks to rebuild, it will take years before it can project power at previous levels.

This leaves Iran with one card left to play: its nuclear programme. Iran’s ability to dial down its nuclear activities in exchange for economic relief – or dial them up to cross the nuclear threshold – gives the Tehran plenty of room to manoeuvre in negotiations. Yet, tensions with Washington seem to be escalating. Donald Trump’s return to office in January saw the return of the “maximum pressure” policy established during his first term following the US’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the multilateral deal aimed at curtailing Iran’s nuclear activities – which Trump deemed too lenient.

Although Trump has previously expressed willingness to strike a deal with the Iranians, Washington’s recent actions amount to an escalation of tensions on the nuclear issue. Under Trump, there has been a return of maximum pressure, threats of military action if Tehran refuses to negotiate, and statements made by the US national security advisor demanding a total halt to uranium enrichment. Most recently, a letter was delivered to Tehran, giving the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a two-month deadline to reach a deal. These moves have done nothing but prove to Iran that the US is not serious about negotiations; yet Iran cannot afford military escalation with the US. Trump still has a chance to make history, carving out a new agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear programme, its ballistic missiles, and it regional proxies – if he sets realistic expectations and avoids humiliating Iran.

Iran’s nuclear gambit: bluff or endgame?

Despite Ayatollah Khamenei’s historical tendency to be cautious in times of crisis, the nuclear taboo in Iran’s public discourse is fading. Hardliners in parliament have called for a review of the supreme leader’s fatwa against nuclear weapons, and ultraconservative news outlets are questioning Iran’s continued membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This shift, initially driven by a need to re-establish a strategic balance with Israel following successive setbacks from April 2024 onwards, is now more in response to US threats of military action. The deterrent value of a nuclear weapons programme has, therefore, risen.

According to CIA Director Bill Burns, Iran could reach the 90% enrichment level required for a nuclear bomb in under two weeks and produce a fully operational weapon in approximately six months. Since Trump’s re-election, the Iranians appear to be playing hard-ball, notifying UN nuclear watchdog the IAEA of plans to install 6,000 new centrifuges while quadrupling the production of enriched uranium. The ultimate goal of this strategy remains unclear: Ayatollah Khamenei is well aware that a step towards weaponisation could be perceived as a casus belli by the US and Israel and trigger a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities. Yet he also knows that US involvement is necessary , if such a strike were to inflict significant damage on its nuclear programme.

However, Trump has sent mixed signals regarding his Middle Eastern strategy, notably with the recent strikes on Houthi facilities in Yemen – the heaviest since January 2024. For Iran, the Americans’ unpredictability further complicates the path forward. Tehran does not want to appear to be capitulating by entering negotiations with the US, though it knows that military escalation is economically unsustainable. Trump’s bellicose rhetoric might, therefore, lead the Iranians to consider an approach similar to North Korea: choosing to pre-empt the issue by crossing the nuclear threshold to secure an effective deterrent once and for all.

A diplomatic window worth seizing

Trump’s second term coincides with a period of profound change in the Middle East, providing him with a rare opportunity to significantly reduce the risk of a nuclear Iran and, in turn, prevent the opening of a Pandora’s box of regional proliferation. Tehran is currently not in an advantageous position neither in the region at large nor at home – where difficult economic conditions are placing the regime under mounting pressure. This gives Trump leverage to make a deal, provided he allows the Iranian leadership to save face. Despite public rejections, Iranian officials have quietly signalled willingness at several points to negotiate with the Trump administration, most recently through the Iranian permanent mission at the UN.

The current geopolitical context favours a broader JCPOA 2.0, potentially including Iran’s proxy network in addition to its expanding nuclear programme.

While it is unlikely that Iran will agree to forgo enrichment capabilities entirely – historically the only state to do so was South Africa – a return to the original terms of the agreement – with stricter implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol for in-depth oversight of its facilities – is feasible in exchange for sanctions relief. Such a deal could also mark the end of Iran’s hold over the region, particularly as critical proxies have proven ineffective. In Lebanon the recent ceasefire and appointment of Joseph Aoun as its president may indicate movement in this direction – as these major changes would likely not have occurred had Iran been against them.

Is Iran looking to buy time to perfect its nuclear weapons programme, or does it genuinely seek reintegration into the international arena. This is a difficult question to answer. Tehran’s motives are unclear: is nuclear capability a means of securing regime survival or a deterrent against external attacks on their soil? The deterrent theory is questionable given that Iran has not been put off by Israel or Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals from launching direct strikes on their respective territories.

If there is one clear lesson from Assad’s fall, it is that authoritarian regimes are not always as strong as they appear to be. Like Syria, the Iranian regime has been unpopular domestically for years and could ultimately prove to be a house of cards. Khamenei likely understands this, which is why now is the time for a long-term solution to the nuclear challenge.

From bilateral deal to regional denuclearisation

While JCOPA 2.0 is unlikely to provide a permanent guarantee of non-proliferation, it could be a stepping stone towards the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone – a concept first conceived by Egypt and Iran in 1974 to exercise pressure on Israel to denuclearise. To this day, Tel Aviv remains the region’s sole nuclear power.

This initiative has long been stalled due to Tel Aviv’s categorical refusal to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal. However, if a multilateral effort remains unattainable for the time being, bilateral processes can still be pursued to curb further proliferation – notably between Tehran and Riyadh. The two have already deepened their cooperation through the Beijing Agreement, which has shielded the Saudis, and the Gulf countries at large, from Houthi attacks and enabled joint military exercises between Riyadh and Tehran. Donald Trump therefore has an historic opportunity to initiate this process – one that would not only address Middle East security concerns but also enable him to pivot towards South-east Asia and his strategic rivalry with China. The question remains: will he choose to seize it?