MENA Strategic Bulletin

Houthis pledge to attack Israel despite US ceasefire deal

Yemen’s Houthi movement has pledged to continue attacks against Israel despite its newly inked ceasefire with the US. The ceasefire, mediated by Oman, was designed to protect US vessels operating in the Red Sea, where Houthi forces have been targeting commercial vessels since November 2023. However, Houthi chief negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam clarified that the agreement “does not include Israel in any way”, drawing a sharp distinction between the US and its allies in Tel Aviv.

The deal was announced on Tuesday by US President Donald Trump, who declared that American strikes against the Houthis would cease immediately in exchange for the group halting its attacks on Red Sea maritime traffic. The move followed weeks of tit-for-tat strikes that saw US and allied forces hitting Houthi positions across Yemen. Hours before the deal was announced, Israeli fighter jets bombed Sanaa International Airport, with Houthi officials reporting estimated $500m worth of damage.

Stakeholder and regional impact

For Israel, the Houthi threat has always been viewed through the prism of its alliance with the US. The Israeli government has largely outsourced the Houthi issue to Washington, instead focusing its campaign against Iranian influence on Hezbollah and Hamas. Nonetheless, the Houthis represent one of Iran’s most potent proxies. Even if their operational independence has grown in recent years, the group remains ideologically aligned with Iran.

Iran welcomed the cessation of US strikes, lauding Yemen’s “legendary resistance”, while Saudi Arabia, ever eager to stabilise the Red Sea corridor, praised Oman’s diplomatic role. The deal boosted Oman’s credentials as the Gulf’s most credible mediators.

Despite the ceasefire, the Houthis remain defiant in their stance against Israel, making it clear that their military campaign is linked directly to the war in Gaza. Their Red Sea offensive began explicitly in response to Israel’s siege, and that link, they insist, remains intact. With the ceasefire coming in the ninth of week of an Israeli blockade on humanitarian supplies entering Gaza, the Houthis are keen to underline their ongoing solidarity with the Palestinians.

What’s next?

Tensions between Israel and the Houthis are likely to intensify. The ceasefire with the US may reduce direct pressure on Houthi targets, but it does nothing to address their core grievance, which is with Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza. Israel, for its part, will almost certainly seek to drag Trump back into the fray, portraying the Houthis not merely as a regional irritant but as a dangerous Iranian asset.

Herein lies the fragility of the US-Houthi ceasefire. The Houthis have shown they are not bound by Washington’s priorities, and if Israeli provocations persist, renewed attacks on Red Sea shipping could follow. In that case, the Oman-mediated deal would prove little more than a temporary pause.

Syria engages in indirect talks with Israel

In a remarkable turn of regional diplomacy, Ahmed Al Sharaa has confirmed indirect talks with Israel, stating they are intended to calm rising tensions and prevent further escalation. The talks are reportedly being facilitated through back channels, with Syrian officials having already travelled to Israel in late April for meetings with Israeli defence counterparts.

While the UAE has been named by Reuters as a behind-the-scenes mediator, Abu Dhabi officially denies any role. Nevertheless, Emirati influence remains a credible possibility given its growing footprint in regional diplomacy and established ties with Tel Aviv.

Stakeholder and regional impact

Ahmad Al Sharaa’s publicisation of these back-channel talks is likely to be a deliberate performance for Washington. The comments are consistent with Al Sharaa’s sentiments expressed during a late-April meeting with US Congressmen, when he declared openness to normalisation with Israel, albeit on specific terms.

Al Sharaa is presenting himself as pragmatic, reformed and ready to make difficult concessions.  But scepticism is warranted. Only a week ago, Israeli warplanes struck near the Syrian presidential palace, and the Israeli military continues to maintain a 400-metre incursion zone inside Syrian territory. Normalisation rhetoric rings hollow in the face of such realities on the ground.

Israel’s relationship with HTS is not a straightforward one. Israel offered covert support for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly the Nusra Front, against Assad, including by bombing Syrian army bases. With Assad gone, the question is: what now defines the relationship between Israel and HTS? They were allies of circumstance, not ideology, and the collapse of their common enemy may unravel whatever tenuous alignment existed.

At home, Syria’s leadership is sending clear signals. A recent letter to Washington requested relief from US sanctions and pledged that Syria would not pose a threat to any nation, including Israel. This was quickly followed by a crackdown on Palestinian militancy within Syrian borders, including the arrest of key figures from Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian factions on April 22. These moves seem designed to curry favour with both Israel and the US, where Al Sharaa seems to be distancing himself from any kind of militancy and aligning with Western regional ambitions in exchange for US sanction relief.

What’s next?

Sharaa sees Trump’s upcoming MENA visit as a unique opportunity to push for the easing of US sanctions, which, if successful, could provide a significant victory for a new government looking to dispel the unease caused by sectarian violence and Israeli incursions.

Yet despite the flurry of activity, doubts linger about the seriousness of Syria’s intentions. Al Sharaa is positioning the prospect of normalisation and engagement with Israel as leverage for US discussions and the easing of sanctions. Without a named and credible mediator, the talks lack structure and guarantees. If the UAE is indeed involved, the prospects of a breakthrough may improve, given its successful track record of brokering normalisation agreements with Israel. If, however, more conditional actors like Saudi Arabia take the lead, the path forward may become mired in conflicting interests and opaque agendas.

Normalisation remains a remote and risky proposition. It is likely to provoke backlash among key Arab neighbours such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Syria may not yet be prepared to absorb that diplomatic cost. Still, these talks show how highly Syria values US sanction relief, so it may yet consider this regional diplomatic fallout a price worth paying.