MENA Strategic Bulletin – The UAE’s Sudan gamble starts to unravel; UAE–US Orion deal deepens critical minerals ties as supply chain risks grow

By Alice Gower and Amy Stapleton

The UAE’s Sudan gamble starts to unravel

In late October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured El Fasher, the last major Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) stronghold in Darfur. The fall of the city marked a pivotal moment in Sudan’s devastating civil war and brought to attention once again accusations that the UAE has been providing covert support to the RSF. The Sudanese government went so far as to file a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice – alleging complicity in atrocities and material backing to the RSF. Abu Dhabi categorically denies the charges and in May 2025, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, although this was a procedural move that did not actually address the charges themselves. Emirati officials maintain that the UAE supports a ceasefire, humanitarian access and a negotiated civilian transition, dismissing the allegations as politically motivated.

Nevertheless, the claims have gained traction amid growing evidence of external supply routes sustaining the RSF. Investigations by Western intelligence services and independent outlets have identified potential logistical and financial pathways linking RSF-controlled gold exports and procurement networks to intermediaries operating in or through the Emirates. Some of these entities have already been sanctioned by the US and EU, exposing the UAE to reputational and compliance risks even as it insists that any such activities are private, unsanctioned and under review.

Regional and stakeholder impact

The UAE has invested heavily across the Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin over the past decade, in ports, logistics, and security partnerships. Sudan represents both a geopolitical node and a resource corridor for Abu Dhabi. Its Red Sea coastline offers proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb strait – through which much of the UAE’s trade and energy flows – and connects to a network of Emirati commercial interests extending through Port Sudan, Berbera, Assab and Eritrean coastal facilities. These outposts are integral to the UAE’s long-term ambition to maintain a strong presence along maritime access routes between the Gulf, East Africa and the Suez Canal.

Sudan’s internal fragmentation has, paradoxically, opened opportunity for influence. The RSF’s command structure, rooted in Darfur’s gold economy and tribal networks, overlaps with business channels that interact with Emirati markets. Maintaining leverage over both state and non-state actors in Sudan ensures the UAE continued access to resources – particularly gold – and preserves a foothold in Red Sea security architecture at a time when Saudi Arabia and Turkey are pursuing their own regional strategies.

However, this balancing act carries escalating costs. The humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and reports of RSF-led atrocities have prompted new sanctions designations and diplomatic backlash. Western governments, while still viewing Abu Dhabi as a counterterrorism and maritime security partner, are pressing for transparency and greater action over gold trading, aviation logistics, and weapons flows. The UAE has long operated with near-impunity across multiple regional theatres – from Libya to Yemen and, more recently, the Tigray war – leveraging its strategic value to Western partners and Europe’s reluctance to jeopardise lucrative defence and investment ties. Yet signs of impatience are now emerging in Washington and Brussels, and this long-standing indulgence may finally be starting to wane. Within Sudan, Emirati involvement has become a rallying point for nationalist sentiment, complicating any future role Abu Dhabi might play in peace mediation.

What’s next

The UAE faces a narrowing window to reframe its role in Sudan from alleged patron to potential stabiliser. Should Abu Dhabi enforce stricter oversight on its private sector and visibly support humanitarian corridors, it could regain credibility as a broker in Red Sea peace diplomacy. However, if the RSF consolidates control and atrocities persist, international pressure will likely intensify, expanding sanctions to encompass financial and logistical intermediaries within Emirati jurisdiction.

More broadly, Sudan remains a test of the UAE’s Horn of Africa strategy, whether its pursuit of strategic reach and commercial advantage can coexist with the region’s fragile state systems. Abu Dhabi’s next moves in Sudan will signal whether its Red Sea policy is evolving toward collective security and reconstruction or entrenching a perception of power projection by proxy.

UAE–US Orion deal deepens critical minerals ties as supply-chain risks grow

On October 23, the US and the UAE launched a $1.8bn Orion Critical Minerals Consortium, a joint venture between the US International Development Finance Corporation, Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Orion Resource Partners. The fund will prioritise financing or operating near-term mining and processing projects to boost supplies of lithium, copper and rare earths for the US and its allies – inputs vital to EVs, renewables, defence, AI and data centres. Each partner has committed $600m initially, with a target to scale to $5bn via additional investors.

The newly announced Consortium expands on an earlier 50:50 joint venture – Orion Abu Dhabi – a 50:50 joint venture formed in January 2025 to invest in mining and processing across Africa, Asia and Latin America. ADQ has pledged $1.2bn over four years to support projects in those regions.

The two vehicles represent a significant deepening of US–UAE cooperation on securing critical mineral supply chains and underscores the UAE’s position as a leader among GCC states in efforts to position themselves as key nodes in Western-facing minerals supply chains.

Regional and stakeholder impact

Since 2023 China, which today controls the majority of the world’s critical mineral processing and refining capacity has progressively tightened export restrictions on key minerals in response to US and allied restrictions on trade and advanced technology. These curbs have disrupted trade, exposed supply-chain fragilities and – critically for policymakers – turned minerals security into a question of national security. In addition to seeking to de-escalate with Beijing, Washington has responded by ramping up efforts to diversify supply chains, including through initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership, which brings together the EU and 15 other states in an effort to ensure resilient and diversified supply chains to US-allied partners.

For Gulf governments, US and China tensions are both a challenge and an opening. Clean-energy, EV and advanced-manufacturing plans – and defence programmes integrated with Western ecosystems – depend on secure access to lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earths, among others, leaving GCC strategies vulnerable to policy shifts in Beijing. By leveraging their financial muscle, geographical location, and individual strategic advantages to position themselves as reliable minerals suppliers, the GCC states see an opportunity to attract Western technology and investment, advance and protect their diversification agendas, and secure geopolitical influence in the post-oil era.

Against this backdrop, critical minerals have become a new arena of regional strategic competition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE – which have put minerals at the forefront of economic diversification priorities and are deploying substantial sovereign capital into mining and processing at home and abroad. The Orion vehicles underscore the UAE’s lead as Washington’s key Gulf partner on critical minerals. Lacking significant domestic reserves of minerals, Abu Dhabi has bought into overseas mining assets, as well as ports and logistics, in Africa and Latin America – resource rich regions where Western presence is limited. Leveraging DP World and AD Ports, the Emirates is building a “mine-to-market” value chain that enables it to control sourcing, processing and export of critical minerals and strategic raw materials.

A further differentiator is the UAE’s alignment of defence and resource strategy: it aims to build an export-oriented military industry while securing inputs for aerospace, semiconductors and advanced weapons. That overlap has widened space for US cooperation. In May 2025, Emirates Global Aluminium and the Tawazun Council signed an MoU with US defence and aerospace firm RTX (formally Raytheon) to produce gallium from bauxite waste in the UAE – a move that could make the Emirates the world’s second-largest producer after China and bolster diversification away from Beijing.

Saudi–US cooperation, though more nascent, is also advancing. Riyadh – which is estimated to hold roughly $2.5trn in mineral wealth – has sought to position itself as a reliable alternative to China by leveraging its abundant reserves and low-cost energy in the building of a domestic mining and processing ecosystem. The Kingdom issued 144% more mining licences in the first half of 2025 compared to the previous year as part of a drive to attract $100bn in mining investment by 2030. In May, the state-owned mining giant Ma’aden signed an MoU with US firm MP Materials to jointly explore, mine and process critical minerals. In 2024, Manara Minerals Investment Company – a joint venture between Ma’aden and the Public Investment Fund – completed the acquisition of a 10% stake in the multinational mining giant Vale’s base metals business. The transaction, valued at $2.5bn, marks Saudi Arabia’s first major global mining investment. Vale operates mines in Canada, Brazil, and Indonesia – where Chinese businesses are active.

What’s next

The extent to which Gulf states can – or intend to – offset China’s dominance of minerals supply chains is uncertain. The GCC push is significant but in the early stages, especially Saudi Arabia’s mining drive. Gulf economies still rely on China for inputs and clean-energy manufacturing and continue to court Chinese capital and expertise to build local industry.

Their strategies are best described as pragmatic hedging: diversifying supply and partnering with Western actors where interests align, without directly challenging Beijing’s prime position. Western partners, meanwhile, are wary of replacing one dependency with another – or amplifying GCC leverage beyond oil. Through initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership, they are pressing for transparent governance and genuinely diversified, multi-source supply chains.

Going forwards, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are likely to push further into mid- and downstream processing and tighter supply-chain integration. In April 2025 – one month before its MoU with MP Materials – Ma’aden said it aimed to select at least one partner by the end of June for a domestic rare-earths processing plant, a step towards converting raw feedstock into magnet-grade material. Further details have yet to be disclosed. The UAE is expected to deploy more capital for processing and trading platforms alongside its logistics footprint: International Resources Holding – established in 2022 to drive the UAE’s “mine to market” strategy – plans a copper-trading hub in Abu Dhabi, while DP World and AD Ports continue expanding corridors that link African and Latin American production to global markets; Abu Dhabi is also deepening minerals cooperation with the DRC and Zambia.