MENA Strategic Bulletin – Bahrain’s normalisation stance faces stress test; Sudani’s election victory at risk in Iraq

Holding the Line: Bahrain, the Abraham Accords, and Gulf Fractures After Gaza

On 7 November 2025, Kazakhstan moved to join the Abraham Accords, signalling Israel and the US’s intent to keep the normalisation framework alive despite the Gaza war. The regional political climate in the Middle East, however, points the other way. Across the Gulf, public anger over Gaza has hardened, making new normalisation moves highly unlikely in the near term. Among existing signatories, Bahrain’s trajectory is distinctive. It has stayed the course on normalisation while carefully managing domestic opinion and intra-GCC dynamics.

Regional and stakeholder impact

Bahrain’s decision to normalise with Israel in 2020 was pragmatic. It sought to reinforce its US security anchor while opening the door to accessing Israeli intelligence and defence cooperation – benefits that remain salient even as the politics have grown more fraught. Given Bahrain’s close strategic alignment with Saudi Arabia, its ability to hold the line on normalisation also offers a cautious proxy for where Riyadh is prepared to sit on Israel for now – not advancing but not forcing a visible reversal either.

For Bahrain, however, the material upside of normalisation has been relatively limited compared with larger economies such as the UAE – according to the United Nations (UN) Comtrade Database, total trade in goods throughout 2021-2024 between the UAE and Israel reached US$6.4 billion, compared to US$50 million between Bahrain and Israel – while the political cost has been higher. This asymmetry makes Manama’s decision to stay the course more striking. It is defending a strategic choice whose dividends are primarily in the security realm, but whose visible price is paid in the domestic political sphere.

The Israeli strike against Hamas operatives in Doha on 9 September 2025 sharpened these tensions. While many GCC capitals issued rapid, condemnatory statements that framed the attack as a violation of Gulf sovereignty requiring a strong collective response, Bahrain’s official messaging struck a notably de-escalatory tone, emphasising solidarity with Qatar while urging restraint and de-escalation. This contrasts with the more muscular language adopted by some neighbours and aligns with Manama’s broader pattern of calibrated hedging.

That pattern predates the current crisis. Even during Syria’s regional isolation, Bahrain maintained official channels with Damascus, illustrating its preference for preserving diplomatic options while staying under a US security umbrella.

What’s next

Attention now shifts to the 46th GCC Summit, which Bahrain is set to host on 3 December. Traditionally held at the leadership level, this year’s summit will be watched closely for signs of how Gulf leaders balance their internal differences on Israel and Gaza. Whether Qatar’s emir attends will be particularly telling.

For Bahrain, the summit is both a stage and a stress test. It offers a chance to project diplomatic steadiness – but also risks highlighting how isolated its normalisation stance has become. As the Gaza conflict continues to dominate regional sentiment, Bahrain’s challenge is not to reaffirm its place in the Abraham Accords, but to ensure that position does not come at the expense of its standing within the Arab world.

Sudani’s Election Victory at Risk: The Fight for Iraq’s Premiership

On 11 November 2025, Iraq held parliamentary elections for all 329 seats in the Council of Representatives. Initial results show Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition emerging as the largest bloc, with roughly mid-40s seats, well short of the 165 needed for a majority. Turnout was just over 56% of registered voters, higher than in 2021 but still reflecting deep public scepticism. The influential Sadrist movement again abstained, depressing participation in some Shia heartlands. The map broadly followed ethno-sectarian lines, with Shia lists dominating the south, Sunni forces in the west and Kurds in the north; the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) consolidated its lead in the Kurdish region and performed strongly in Nineveh.

Regional and stakeholder impact

Regionally, the result preserves Iraq’s status as a key arena in the Iran–US–Gulf balance. Iran-aligned Shia parties and militias improved or maintained their parliamentary weight and will be central to government formation, ensuring Tehran retains multiple veto players inside the Shia camp. At the same time, Sudani’s relatively popular record on basic services and infrastructure, backed by high oil revenues, has made him a useful interlocutor for both Washington and Gulf capitals, who see in him a pragmatic nationalist able to keep Iraq out of direct regional confrontation.

Gulf states, Turkey and Western partners will interpret the higher turnout and the absence of major violence as a modest vote for continuity and stability, but they also see the persistence of vote-buying, militia influence and low youth trust as indicators that Iraq’s institutions remain fragile. If intra-Shia competition produces a prolonged government vacuum, that could reopen space for militia escalation, cross-border strikes and proxy contestation on Iraqi soil.

What’s next

Government formation will now hinge on complex bargaining among Shia factions, Kurdish parties (especially the KDP and PUK) and Sunni blocs, with Kurdish and Sunni leaders again positioned as king-makers.  Whether Sudani stays in post depends less on his electoral performance than on intra-Shia deals. Powerful figures such as Nouri al-Maliki and other Coordination Framework leaders may seek to trade their parliamentary support for either another term for Sudani on tighter conditions or a consensus replacement. Sudani could win the election but lose the premiership if rivals coalesce around an alternative Shia candidate.

On balance, his pathway to a second term is plausible but not assured. If he can hold his coalition together, reassure Iran-aligned partners that he will not curb their influence too aggressively, and offer Kurds and Sunnis credible deals on disputed territories, budget transfers and reconstruction, regional actors are likely to welcome his re-appointment as a stabilising outcome. Failure to do so would signal a more fragmented Iraqi centre of gravity, complicating efforts to use Baghdad as a bridge between Iran, the Gulf and Western powers.