Can Syria provide a viable alternative to blocked regional trade routes?

Persistent domestic challenges will prevent Syria from effectively capitalising on disruption to the region’s main trade corridors.

By Archie Longrigg, a participant in Azure’s Analyst Publication Programme.

Amid continued upheaval caused by the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, Syria is presenting itself as an alternative route for commercial transportation as businesses and governments alike seek to diversify away from vulnerable maritime choke points. Yet, domestic challenges are likely to frustrate the capacity of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s administration to seize this opportunity, as political uncertainty and a complex security landscape constrain its feasibility.

The opportunity comes as Damascus continues to pursue a policy of robust non-intervention in the conflict, in order to concentrate on domestic consolidation, protect the country from yet more war, and avoid the possibility of renewed sectarian violence at home. In practical terms, this has meant containing potential spillover by securing Syria’s borders with Lebanon and Iraq, while outwardly positioning Syria as a neutral power, seeking stable and pragmatic relations with regional counterparts. This position was made clear by al-Sharaa in his 20^th March Eid address, which focused on preventing Syria’s re-emergence as a theatre for regional conflict, and instead committing to ‘harmony’ with regional and international partners.

This recalibration of foreign policy underpins al-Sharaa’s strategy for Syria’s post-Assad recovery. Damascus has distanced itself from Iran and established closer ties with the US and the Gulf, in a bid to attract lucrative investment deals to boost economic reconstruction. Indeed, al-Sharaa recently completed a tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE between 21-23 April, aimed at strengthening bilateral ties and seeking assurances on Gulf investment in Syria.

Damascus’ plan to provide an alternative route for the transport of energy and other critical goods is a continuation of this strategy. Speaking at a meeting of EU and Middle Eastern heads of government in Cyprus on 24 April, al-Sharaa outlined his ‘Four Seas’ initiative, marketing Syria as a neutral, secure corridor linking Europe, Central Asia, and the Gulf.

As disruption to the Strait of Hormuz continues, this proposal is likely to gain increasing traction as regional and international actors seek alternative transport options to hedge against future disruptions.

However, Syria is not yet in a position to guarantee a safe and reliable route for exporters due to considerable domestic security and political stability challenges.

Domestic challenges constrain the feasibility of the four seas initiative

Syria’s domestic situation is fragmented and complex. Sectarian tensions bring substantial risk to commercial operations in the country, limiting its credibility as an alternative route for regional trade.

For example, the Rojava in northeastern Syria, a region of significant insecurity and complexity, lies at the centre of the Kurdish issue. Indeed, the region is a critical component in Sharaa’s mission to reintegrate the country’s diverse factions into a unified state structure. The government reached a deal with the SDF in late January to gradually integrate the autonomous region back under central control. Yet, despite this progress, authority over the area remains contested, not only between the Syrian army and the SDF, but also amongst rival Arab tribes. ISIS also continues to operate in the region.

This insecurity is replicated across southern and coastal regions where external actors are exploiting sectarian divides. Israel initiated military activity in support of the Druze, carrying out airstrikes in southern Syria on the 20 March. For this reason, al-Sharaa has taken a non-interventionist approach to reduce the risk of sectarian groups becoming involved in the broader conflict.

Yet this balancing act is precarious. Reports in late March stated that Washington had asked Damascus to consider joining a ground invasion against Hezbollah, putting al-Sharaa in a difficult position. Syrian entry into the war would likely spark renewed sectarian violence, yet Damascus does not have the leverage to refuse US demands. While al-Sharaa has so far resisted this pressure, a drawn-out conflict may prompt an increasingly frustrated Trump to reassert this demand.

A further risk is the coherence of the Syrian armed forces. The army remains an evolving entity held together by former rebel factions, dominated by former HTS fighters. Ideological tensions between factions, including in relation to the integration of SDF fighters, reduces the force’s domestic legitimacy and limits its operational capacity to respond to rising insecurity.

In addition to security risks, Syria lacks the proper infrastructure to support widespread commercial transportation. Years of conflict have left many road networks in disrepair, while oil and gas infrastructure has largely been destroyed. Fixing these issues will not be easy, quick, or cheap, especially with multiple stakeholders across local and national authorities to appease.

Furthermore, Syria remains a designated state sponsor of terrorism by the US congress, placing restrictions on many American exports and foreign aid and complicating the re-entry of US firms to the country.

However, despite these challenges, international exporters have begun using Syria as an overland route to bypass the blocked Strait of Hormuz. Iraq’s SOMO secured a contract to transport 650,000 metric tons of fuel oil per month for the period between April and June, entering through the al-Tanf crossing and exporting it to Europe via the port of Baniyas. German exporters have also revived overland transport links through Syria to move goods to the Gulf.

The revival of land routes through Syria should be understood as an exceptional and temporary arrangement, rather than a long-term option. These routes take longer and are more expensive for exporters. As a result, once pressures on the region’s main sea routes are eased, trade will likely move back to these channels.

What’s next

Looking ahead, though domestic challenges limit Syria’s capacity to provide a credible trade corridor in the short-term, the Four Seas vision illustrates the country’s potential to play a critical role in the region.

The US-Israeli conflict has emphasised the importance of getting Syria’s post-Assad reconstruction right, as events in Syria directly impact the wider region. Rebuilding the country into a stable, functional state is not just about shielding it from threats within and outside of its borders but building it to play a role in stabilising the broader Middle East. Its geopolitical location is strategic, and a stable Syria has the potential to act as a regional conduit for cooperation on energy, trade, transit, and beyond.

Exploiting this opportunity in the long-term requires genuine structural reforms from Damascus. Al-Sharaa is seen by many factions as a former jihadist fighter, who does not share their interests. Concerted efforts to secure political inclusion for all groups are critical to resolve internal conflicts. The 2025 National Dialogue was an excellent first step towards this goal, yet the government’s failure to publish its conclusions represents a missed opportunity to address the underlying causes of sectarian divisions and demonstrate its commitment to resolving them.

At present, Syria’s ambitions to become a major trade corridor are unlikely to materialise unless the country can effectively tackle its internal challenges. While the international community is supportive, and there is high interest in Syria’s potential, the al-Sharaa administration would be wise to focus on securing domestic legitimacy and security, as these are prerequisites for both inward investment and realising the country’s potential in the wider region.