MENA Strategic Bulletin

Syria’s interim government pursues international legitimacy

The transition of power in post-Assad Syria is now unfolding, with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emerging as the most prominent group and its leader, Mohammad Al Jolani, actively striving for international recognition. HTS, formed out of groups previously affiliated with Al Qaeda and designated a terrorist organisation by the US and the UK, has distanced itself from extremist rhetoric and undertaken significant reforms. This week, the group’s efforts seemed to be gaining international traction, as notable engagement from the UK, Germany, France and the UN signalled a willingness to lift sanctions and support for an interim HTS government, set to remain in place until March 2025.

 Regional and stakeholder impact

The West’s renewed engagement with HTS signals a calculated shift towards pragmatism, recognising the group’s emergence as Syria’s dominant force.  France’s reopening of its Damascus embassy after 12 years and Turkey’s call for an inclusive government, along with pressure on the EU to ease sanctions, reflect a broader recalibration of priorities in post-Assad Syria.

HTS leader Abu Mohammed Al Jolani’s efforts to secure international recognition are bearing fruit. His meetings with UK officials, which resulted in a £50 million ($63.6m) humanitarian aid pledge, mark a symbolic yet cautious step towards re-engagement. Germany and other nations are also initiating dialogue with HTS.

Humanitarian aid has become a growing focal point. UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen, speaking at the first UN Security Council meeting since Assad’s overthrow, emphasised the urgency of addressing Syria’s deteriorating conditions. The projected return of up to 1m refugees between January and June 2025 underscores the acute need for coordinated international efforts to ensure sustainable reintegration and stability. This delicate balance between aid, governance and geopolitics will define the next phase of Syria’s turbulent transition.

 What’s next?

The path to normalisation in Syria remains complex and uncertain. HTS’s Al Qaeda ancestry and its Islamist ideology continue to fuel scepticism among Western powers. Any move towards easing sanctions or granting formal recognition will depend on tangible reforms that demonstrate the group’s commitment to inclusive governance and democratic principles. This highlights a core challenge for international stakeholders: balancing urgent humanitarian needs with broader political concerns.

The success of Syria’s transition hinges on HTS’s actions and the global response. As HTS pursues international legitimacy, the pressure to deliver effective humanitarian aid and establish an inclusive government is likely to intensify. The anticipated return of refugees will require substantial international funding to support reintegration and rebuilding efforts.

Diplomatic efforts towards ceasefire in Gaza intensify

The ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, long in a state of stalemate, have seen a notable shift this week. CIA Director Bill Burns arrived in Doha on Wednesday December 18 to meet with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, showing US involvement and increased efforts to reach a ceasefire. This visit followed a series of diplomatic meetings earlier in the week, including an Israeli delegation’s meetings with mediators in Qatar on Monday and the visit of Trump’s hostage envoy Adam Boehler to Cairo on Tuesday.

Progress has been cautiously acknowledged on both sides. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has expressed optimism, stating that an agreement is closer than ever. Meanwhile, Hamas described the discussions as “serious and positive” but warned that Israel’s insistence on additional conditions threatens to derail the progress. Palestinian officials have confirmed that negotiations are entering a “decisive and final phase”. Despite these advancements, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s previous pattern of sabotaging ceasefire agreements remains an active risk.

 Regional and stakeholder impact

The proposed ceasefire plan closely aligns with a framework outlined by US President Joe Biden on May 31, which detailed a three-phase process. In the initial stage, civilian and female Israeli hostages being held in Gaza would be released within 45 days, coinciding with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from city centres, the coastal road and areas bordering Egypt. This phase also includes enabling displaced Gazans to return to their homes in the north and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid. The second phase focuses on returning the remaining Israeli hostages in exchange for 10,000 Palestinian prisoners and completing further troop withdrawals. The final stage aims to end hostilities.

For Hamas, the primary objectives are halting Israeli airstrikes and lifting the Gaza blockade, which has severely impacted life in the territory. The group, having suffered significant losses in leadership, is now more inclined to push for a ceasefire. To strengthen its negotiating position, Hamas has provided Egyptian mediators with a prioritised list of hostages, including the sick, elderly and those with US citizenship.

For Israel, having dealt major damage to Hamas’s operational capacity and leadership structure, there is mounting domestic pressure to end the war and secure the safe return of the hostages. With Hezbollah also dramatically weakened and the fall of the Assad regime having dealt a major blow to Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”, Netanyahu may be inclined to accept a ceasefire agreement and cast the return of the hostages as the final piece in a victorious military campaign.

Despite extensive mediation efforts, Egypt and Qatar have repeatedly failed to broker a lasting ceasefire, raising doubts about their chances of success this time round. However, Donald Trump’s November election victory has injected new momentum into diplomatic efforts, with the Biden administration now pushing harder to achieve a ceasefire before the president-elect’s inauguration. Trump’s warning that “it’s not going to be pleasant” if a deal is not reached may give negotiations some needed diplomatic urgency.

What’s next?

If an agreement is reached, it will require swift international cooperation, particularly in providing humanitarian aid to Gaza. More crucially, stakeholders will need to confront the complex post-war dynamics: the future relationship between Gaza and Israel, and the governance structure that will emerge in the aftermath. These are fraught issues, and Trump’s impending inauguration will put pressure on global partners to take greater responsibility in the task of stabilising Gaza and ensure lasting peace in the region.

Israel strikes Houthi sites in Yemen

On early Thursday morning, Israel launched airstrikes on Yemen’s Sanaa and Hodeida, killing nine people. The strikes were justified as retaliation against the Iran-backed Houthi movement, which launched a ballistic missile targeting military sites near Tel Aviv on Wednesday.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric was unequivocal: the Houthis, described as part of Iran’s “axis of evil”, would pay a heavy price for any strikes on Israel. The retaliation is the IDF’s first attack on Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and represent a dramatic broadening of the conflict. Conducted in two waves, the strikes targeted strategic infrastructure, including the Ras Isa and Salif ports in Hodeida and power stations in Sanaa.

The strikes come at a moment of strategic strength for Israel, which sees them as an opportunity to destabilise one of Iran’s last reliable proxies and assert its dominance in the region.

Regional and stakeholder impact

 Israel’s strikes on Yemen could have profound regional implications, most of which revolve around Iran. After the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria and with Hezbollah and Hamas stretched thin, the Houthis represent one of Iran’s most active remaining proxies. By targeting the Houthis, Israel aims to deal further damage to the Islamic Republic’s regional influence.

Tehran’s condemnation of the strikes as a “gross violation of international law” was predictable, but the reality is more complex. Tehran has invested heavily in the Houthis, not only as a tool to challenge Saudi Arabia but also as a strategic irritant for Israel, particularly through the disruption of Red Sea shipping routes. The Houthis have already damaged Israel’s economy: their blockade of the Red Sea forced Israel to close its Eilat port, effectively shutting down a key maritime trade route.

For the Houthis this escalation risks backfiring. The Houthis lack the resources to sustain a prolonged confrontation with a militarily superior Israel, particularly if Israel continues to escalate its operations. There are risks involved for Israel too. While undermining the Houthis would deal a further blow to Iran’s regional influence, it could also provoke a more unified response from Iran itself or its militias in Iraq, risking a wider conflict.

What’s next?

The expectation is that Israel’s strikes on Yemen will not prove to be isolated events, as Netanyahu’s government, emboldened by the decline of Iranian proxies elsewhere, seeks to drive home its strategic superiority. The Houthis’ missile strikes, though disruptive, provide Israel with a convenient pretext to intensify its campaign against Iranian-backed forces. The Houthis’ demands – cessation of Israeli aggression, lifting the Gaza blockade and withdrawal of forces – are unlikely to be met, increasing the likelihood of further missile strikes.

For Israel, the challenge will be balancing its military objectives in Yemen with the risk of regional spillover, especially if Iran decides to escalate in response. This latest escalation also underscores a grim reality: Yemen, like Lebanon and Gaza, may become the next proxy battlefield for broader geopolitical struggles.