MENA Strategic Bulletin

Key developments in Syria: political progress amid escalating violence

Last week, Syria experienced a wave of political, economic, and security developments – some promising, others deeply troubling.

Politically, interim President Ahmed Al Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leader Mazloum Abdi reached a landmark agreement in Damascus on March 10. The deal integrates SDF’s civil and military institutions into the Syrian state, grants constitutional rights to the Kurdish community, and mandates a nationwide ceasefire.

Facilitated by the US and approved by Turkey, the agreement is more symbolic than substantive. It signals a willingness to cooperate but lacks concrete mechanisms for implementation, leaving ample room for setbacks. The SDF and Kurdish forces control one-third of Syria, including vital oil fields, and Damascus will be eager to reassert control over this critical economic asset. However, the AANES will not want to cede this strategic resource; this is just one area where implementation is likely to prove difficult.

Separately, the Syrian interim government has reportedly reached a tentative agreement with Druze leaders in Sweida province to integrate the community into state institutions. However, internal divisions complicate this process. Some Druze factions align with Israel and reject the new government, raising security concerns and increasing tensions. Despite this fragmentation, an agreement is likely to take place, as Sharaa seeks to consolidate his authority and bring key communities under his administration. If finalised, the deal would bolster his broader efforts to unify Syria’s diverse factions and present his administration as a legitimate national force.

Economically, the UK lifted asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities, including the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines, and key energy firms, while maintaining sanctions on Assad regime members and figures tied to the Captagon trade. While HTS remains a designated terrorist organisation, this move signals an attempt to jump-start Syria’s economic recovery and potentially pave the way for further international engagement. It marks a step beyond the EU’s cautious easing of restrictions, which provided limited relief on entities such as the Syrian Central Bank while keeping sanctions intact.

However, with US sanctions still in place, the real impact of Britain’s sanction policy will be constrained. Western nations continue to link economic relief to political reforms, emphasising the need for inclusive governance. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office made it clear: “We will judge Syria’s interim authorities by their actions, not their words.”

On the ground, however, optimism is overshadowed by bloodshed as Syria witnessed the bloodiest week since Assad’s overthrow. Pro-Assad loyalists launched attacks along the Eastern Coast, particularly in Latakia, initially killing at least 16 security personnel. The fighting escalated, resulting in over 1,000 civilian casualties. Many victims were Alawites, and at least 125 Syrian security force members and 148 Assad loyalists were killed. In response, Sharaa’s administration has set up a fact-finding committee to investigate human rights violations and hold perpetrators accountable. This is a critical test for Sharaa and his promise to create a Syria for all Syrians – including through pursuing justice. Syrians will be watching the way in which violations by the security forces are handled, as an indication of the new administration’s intent going forward.

Syria stands at a crossroads. Diplomatic breakthroughs and economic shifts offer glimpses of a possible future beyond war, yet the entrenched sectarian violence and political fragility threaten to unravel any progress.

Regional and stakeholder impact

Syrian Kurdish community: The agreement with Sharaa represents a historic breakthrough for the Kurdish population, which has long faced marginalisation. While the deal does not grant autonomy, it formally acknowledges Kurdish identity and guarantees their constitutional rights – an unprecedented recognition at the state level. However, the devil is in the detail and the lack of clear actionable steps will make implementation difficult.

Turkey: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, facing declining domestic approval, has welcomed the Kurdish deal in Syria as a step toward regional stability, stating that the agreement will “serve peace”. But his support is strategic. Erdogan hopes to leverage Kurdish backing for constitutional changes that could extend his rule beyond 2028. His government’s outreach to imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan reflects these ambitions.  Yet, Turkey’s long-standing mistrust of Kurdish militancy means Ankara will closely monitor the agreement and act if it perceives a threat.

Syria: Sharaa’s agreements with the SDF and the Druze are some of his most significant political wins to date – even if only symbolically. He is proving his ability to engage with different ethnic groups while maintaining alignment with key allies such as the US and Turkey. His push for inclusivity could enhance his standing in the West, particularly with the US, and strengthen his case for sanctions relief. However, unifying Syria’s fractured communities is no small task, and the durability of these agreements remains uncertain.

What’s next?

While political agreements and economic openings signal progress towards reconstruction, Syria’s security landscape remains volatile. Sanctions relief may facilitate economic recovery, but sustained violence threatens to undermine progress and weaken Syria’s transition as well as the interim government’s legitimacy. The newly formed justice committee under Sharaa must swiftly and transparently address the surge in sectarian violence to maintain credibility and exert authority on behalf of all Syrians. If stability is not established, Syria’s fragile gains risk unravelling, plunging the nation back into chaos.

Houthis threaten to resume Red Sea attacks

On Wednesday, March 12, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement declared that it would attacks on Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, after Israel failed to resume aid deliveries to Gaza. Israel had cut electricity supplies and humanitarian deliveries to the strip after the end of the first phase of the fragile ceasefire passed without agreement to proceed to Phase 2.  The Houthis had previously suspended their attacks on Red Sea shipping on the condition that Israel allow aid deliveries into Gaza.

With ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas still hanging by a thread in Qatar, the Houthis’ decision signals their willingness to leverage military pressure to influence the direction of the broader conflict. With the US designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organisation earlier this month, increasing its naval presence in the Red Sea, and adopting a more aggressive stance under the Trump administration, the potential for the US to take a more forceful response towards the Houthis is becoming more likely.

Regional and stakeholder impact

Iran: Tehran has played a substantial role in bolstering the strength of the Houthis, but the group has always held its own domestic agenda. The movement is more than an Iranian proxy, and while it cooperates with Iran where their interests align—especially against Western and Israeli influence—the group now recognises its significant leverage over the Red Sea and will use this to its advantage. The Houthis are increasingly important to Iran, after the weakening of Hezbollah, Hamas and the removal of the Assad regime in Syria, but the group is not under the direct control of Tehran and should be treated as a regional force in its own right.

United States: The US’s re-designation of the Houthis as a FTO significantly expands its ability to launch military interventions against the group. This move, coupled with Trump’s recent loosening of restrictions on counterterrorism drone strikes and special operations raids outside conventional war zones, lowers the threshold for US military action.

Commanders now have greater flexibility in targeting Houthi leadership, infrastructure, and supply networks. With previous strikes failing to deter Houthi aggression, a more sustained and intensified US military campaign is looking likely.

Israel: Tel Aviv will rely on the US to address the Houthi issue. Israeli authorities lack intelligence on the group, or access to generate it, and are unable to call on regional allies to help. Gulf countries have established detente with Iran and wish to avoid becoming targets for Houthi strikes once again.  Already engaged on multiple fronts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, Israel is unlikely to intervene directly. Instead, it will rely on the US to take decisive and forceful action.

What’s next?

The Houthis’ ultimatum poses a direct challenge to global trade and Western interests. While the Trump administration may escalate military strikes, this is very unlikely to eliminate the threat may only serve to intensify Houthi actions and drum up further support for the group within Yemen. Further instability in the Red Sea may push Washington toward a different strategy:  pressuring Israel into accepting a second phase of the ceasefire in Gaza in a bid to reduce regional tensions and contain the impact on global trade.