MENA Strategic Bulletin – US–Qatar diplomacy enters new phase; Russia’s influence in Syria wanes

By Alice Gower

Idaho base marks a new phase in US–Qatar transactional diplomacy

 On October 10, the US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and his Qatari counterpart Saoud bin Abdulrahman al-Thani announced that the US Department of Defence and the Qatari Emiri Air Force (QEAF) would establish a permanent QEAF training facility at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho. Funded and constructed by Qatar, the facility will host Qatari pilots and support personnel for advanced training on the F-15QA fighter jet. The aircraft formed part of a $12 billion arms deal agreed in principle under the Obama administration but signed in 2017 under the first Trump White House. The concept of a US-based training hub was floated shortly thereafter and has been under quiet negotiation ever since.

The facility is intended to enhance Qatari-US combined training and interoperability and “increase lethality”, according to Hegseth. The Pentagon has stressed that the site will remain fully under American command in a model that is already operational with other allies such as Poland, Finland, Germany and Singapore.

While the agreement is the culmination of eight years of planning, its public announcement follows a moment of acute strain in bilateral relations between the US and Qatar. On September 9, Israel conducted an airstrike in Doha that targeted senior Hamas figures and killed a Qatari security officer. The US failed to warn Qatar in advance, undermining one of the central assumptions within Doha’s foreign policy: that Washington is a credible security guarantor. The announcement of the Idaho facility just weeks later serves as a signal that, despite tactical lapses, Washington remains committed to its alliance with Doha.

It is also a tangible reaffirmation of Qatar’s strategic importance to Washington following President Trump’s 29 September executive order pledging US defence of Qatar in the event of external aggression. Although executive orders are not legally binding and the scope of the commitment remains vague, the Idaho facility offers physical, enduring proof of US support.

Regional and stakeholder impact

The Idaho arrangement allows Washington to demonstrate renewed and tangible commitment to Qatar while enabling Doha to extract visible proof of that commitment. This is especially significant as Qatar continues to host sensitive negotiations involving Hamas, the Taliban, and other regional actors.

At the same time, the Idaho project serves as Washington’s balancing gesture after the Doha strike. It reassures Qatar without alienating Israel. In that sense, the facility is as much about optics as it is about interoperability.

For Doha, the Idaho agreement offers both a diplomatic recovery and reassertion. Crucially, it cements Qatar’s place as a major partner – it secured major non-NATO ally status in 2022 – in the minds of President Trump and his administration in a shift from Trump’s anti-Qatar stance in 2017, at the outset of the Gulf crisis. It is also material compensation for the perceived US lapse in commitment in September.

For President Trump, the agreement aligns with his transactional approach to foreign policy. It brings Qatari-funded infrastructure and personnel to a US state, creating jobs and investment – longstanding priorities for his administration. It also allows the White House to demonstrate follow-through on the executive order without committing to a formal treaty or deploying additional forces abroad. Domestically, the deal plays well with Trump’s base. It reinforces the narrative that allies must contribute materially to their defence relationships with the US, and that American soil benefits economically from these partnerships. The Idaho facility is a visible example of “America First” diplomacy that still maintains global reach.

Regionally, the deal has been read as a signal to other Gulf partners that America still values its alliances, even if its deterrent credibility has wavered. Yet it also reinforces a view – increasingly prevalent in the Gulf – that reassurance must now be bought through direct investment and tangible reciprocity, not assumed through rhetoric.

For other GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Idaho facility reinforces Qatar’s privileged access to US defence infrastructure. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have long sought similar defence guarantees and arrangements, and the Idaho deal could prompt renewed lobbying for deeper bilateral military integration.

In fact, the Financial Times reports today that Saudi Arabia is in talks to secure a similar commitment to Trump’s Executive Order regarding Qatar; Riyadh hopes this can be announced during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington next month. 

What’s next

US-Gulf partnerships are less based on trust – after a series of disappointments such as the Israeli strike on Doha, US failure to respond to attacks against Khurais and Abqaiq in 2019, the exclusion of Gulf states from JCPOA negotiations and lack of consequences after Bashar al Assad crossed Obama’s chemical weapons red line, among others – and more on the value of transaction.

More broadly, the Idaho agreement highlights how transactional diplomacy now flows in both directions. Where Washington once used arms sales and basing rights to bind partners, states like Qatar have learned to reverse the equation, leveraging their financial resources and geographic and political relevance to extract advantage.

The Idaho facility may thus come to represent not merely a deepening of US–Qatar defence ties, but the maturation of a new diplomatic logic: one in which middle powers are better able to set the terms of engagement with superpowers increasingly in need of credibility.

This model departs from traditional alliance frameworks based on shared values or treaty obligations. Instead, it reflects a modular, interest-based approach where defence relationships are built on mutual leverage and visible deliverables.

Russia’s waning influence in Syria amid Trump’s Middle East diplomacy

 Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow on  October 15 marked his first official meeting with President Vladimir Putin since assuming office. The timing and optics of the visit were carefully calibrated to signal continuity in Russia’s role in Syrian affairs, even as that role has reduced. The trip was intended to precede the Arab-Russia Summit, which Moscow had hoped would reaffirm its standing among Arab states. However, the summit’s abrupt cancellation, officially attributed to scheduling conflicts, exposed deeper geopolitical realities.

Moscow’s influence in Arab capitals has weakened and its exclusion from the US-led ceasefire between Israel and Hamas exemplifies its diminished role in the Middle East.

Following their meeting al-Sharaa emphasised Syria’s intention to restore and redefine its relationship with Russia, noting the long historic relationship and common interests between the two countries. He acknowledged Syria’s partial dependence on Russian expertise and stated that the new leadership was seeking to reshape the nature of bilateral ties to reflect Syria’s independence and long-term security.

Putin, in turn, praised Syria’s recent parliamentary elections as a big success and pledged Russia’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. He voiced support for deeper cooperation in defence, trade, and reconstruction, and expressed hope that Russia would retain access to its military installations in Latakia and Tartus. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov had confirmed that the future of these bases was on the agenda.

Al-Sharaa’s meeting with Putin followed September’s very successful UNGA, where the Syrian president spoke at several think tanks, including the Middle East Institute, and met with the Syrian American Business Council to discuss investment opportunities and reconstruction priorities. These public engagements were designed to project legitimacy, outline Syria’s transitional roadmap, signal his disassociation from Al Qaida and his commitment to a free market economy.

Meanwhile, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani met with US lawmakers and Treasury officials in Washington ahead of the session, marking the first formal engagement between Syrian and US officials in over two decades.

Regional and stakeholder impact

Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow was as much about presentation as it was about substance. The meeting provided an opportunity to demonstrate international outreach beyond US-aligned states and to reinforce al-Sharaa’s image as a pragmatic leader. His presence in Moscow must have made former President Bashar al Assad uncomfortable, given that he and his family have taken refuge there.

Domestically, the visit helped consolidate al-Sharaa’s standing as someone capable of managing relations with rival powers. However, tangible outcomes from Moscow remain limited. Russia continues to operate military installations in Latakia and Tartus, but its influence over Syria’s political direction has declined.

The absence of any tangible outcome from al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow highlights the extent to which Russia is no longer Syria’s principal international partner. That role has been assumed by the US since President Trump came to power. The collapse of the Arab Russia Summit compounded the setback, reinforcing the view that Moscow’s influence in the region has diminished and regional states, except for Iran and Yemen, are more closely aligned with Washington. Moscow is an afterthought.

President Trump’s intensified focus on the Middle East reflects a deliberate recalibration of US strategy. His administration’s role in brokering the Gaza peace deal and facilitating the Israel-Iran ceasefire has drawn regional actors into closer cooperation. Russia, by contrast, has been marginalised. Gulf capitals, led by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, now view US mediation as reliable and outcome oriented.

 What’s next

Russia-Syria relations appear to be entering a more transactional phase. Moscow is likely to retain its security footprint and energy interests, but it no longer shapes Syria’s external alignments. Al-Sharaa’s engagements during UNGA and subsequent meetings in Damascus suggest he is repositioning Syria as a neutral actor, open to reconstruction partnerships and less dependent on any single power.

Al-Sharaa’s international legitimacy is growing, supported by continuous and successful international engagement and his efforts to present Syria as a more stable and predictable actor. At home, his legitimacy depends first on delivering security to all of Syria’s ethnic and religious communities and then providing economic relief. As Washington consolidates its diplomatic influence in Syria and Moscow adjusts to its reduced relevance, Syria’s leadership faces the task of recalibrating alliances to serve the country’s interests in a bid to avoid replicating the mistakes of the old regime.