MENA Strategic Bulletin – Israeli attacks on Lebanon endanger ceasefire; Washington pushes Morocco-Algeria rapprochement

By Amy Stapleton and Alice Gower

Israeli attacks on Lebanon increase amid lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah

In recent days, Israel has carried out its most intense strikes on Lebanon since the ceasefire began eleven months ago. On October 17–18, aircraft and drones hit multiple sites in the south, including Sidon, Nabatieh, Kaoutariyet el-Siyad village, and the Mazraat al-Sinay area. A town in the Bekaa Valley in the east was also hit. The IDF said it targeted both equipment and facilities Hezbollah is using to rebuild its positions and “terrorist infrastructure,” including engineering machinery, quarries, and a local environmental NGO, which it alleges the Iran-backed group was using as cover. Lebanese officials have disputed the claims, insisting the sites were civilian.

Separately, on October 20, US Special Envoy for Syria and Lebanon Tom Barrack posted a lengthy statement on X arguing that the ceasefire he helped broker has effectively failed. He criticised the Lebanese government for not acting decisively to disarm Hezbollah – citing the absence of a direct Israel–Hezbollah agreement, cabinet divisions, and a lack of funding and authority provided to the Lebanese Armed forces (LAF). He warned that Beirut’s continued inaction could prompt unilateral Israeli measures, risk a renewed war, derail elections in 2026 and deepen Lebanon’s instability.

Regional and stakeholder impact

The US- and French-brokered ceasefire that ended 13 months of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in November 2024 looks increasingly tenuous. UN officials warn that the situation remains fragile, with routine violations by both sides. Israeli forces have conducted hundreds of airstrikes on Lebanese territory since the agreement took effect – leaving more than 100 civilians dead and several UN peacekeepers injured – and continue to occupy five border outposts inside southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has withdrawn from positions south of the Litani River and is refraining from retaliatory attacks, but maintains a presence to the north.

This has produced a stalemate. The 2024 ceasefire roadmap, approved by Lebanon and Hezbollah and agreed “in principle” by Israel, depends on parallel steps: Lebanon moves to disarm all non-state actors while Israel halts operations and withdraws. In practice, Israel has made its withdrawal conditional on “prior progress” in disarmament; meanwhile, Hezbollah refuses to consider disarming while Israel remains on Lebanese soil – a position it uses to justify retaining its weapons.

This puts Lebanon’s government in an impossible bind. Israel’s near-daily strikes are intended to stop Hezbollah from rebuilding and to keep pressure on Beirut to deliver disarmament. In practice, they make the task harder: the attacks give credibility to Hezbollah’s claim that its weapons are a necessary deterrent given a weakened state and an under-resourced army. They also risk derailing the economic recovery that the government needs to build broad public support for restoring state sovereignty.

Externally, Washington and international and regional partners urge rapid disarmament; internally, Hezbollah will consider the subject of arms only as part of a discussion about Lebanon’s national security strategy – and only after Israel has left Lebanese soil.

The Lebanese government must also persuade sceptical constituencies that the state – not a militia – can protect sovereignty. State institutions remain hollowed out by war and economic collapse, while Hezbollah retains a significant security and social apparatus that rivals state capacity in many areas. Public backing among its constituents has eroded, but in Shia communities support for its remaining armed persists. The LAF is underfunded and reliant on foreign aid; it cannot credibly outmatch Hezbollah – let alone Israel – and any attempt to confront Hezbollah militarily could fracture the army and ignite internal conflict. Cautious, incremental steps to building domestic buy-in is therefore the most viable course, even if Washington and Israel deem it too slow.

In October, the LAF took a significant step by submitting a plan to the government for full disarmament – prompting a walkout by Hezbollah and allied cabinet ministers. The LAF has earned US praise for incremental progress in the south, yet patience in Washington is wearing thin as the deadline for disarmament – the end of 2025 – approaches. Special envoy Tom Barrack and US officials have unofficially warned that further delays could jeopardise funding and broader support for the ceasefire framework.

What’s next

 There is little prospect of breaking the stalemate in the south, meaning disarmament will remain stalled as long as Israel continues to strike Lebanese territory.

Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, has repeatedly urged the US and other guarantors of the ceasefire to press Israel to halt attacks, warning of the risk to regional stability and the country’s recovery. UNIFIL, the UN’s peacekeeping force in Lebanon, has likewise condemned the strikes as violations of the ceasefire agreement and Security Council Resolution 1701. However, Israel is unlikely to pause operations without US pressure, and for now Washington’s diplomatic leverage is directed at Beirut. In August, under US and Israeli pressure, the UN Security Council voted in a resolution to extend – but then end – its five-decade-long mission on the ground until December 2026.

If there is little or no progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament – and if US policy continues to give free rein to Israel’s military activities – the risk of escalation by either side will increase. Hezbollah has so far exercised “strategic patience” in not retaliating against Israeli strikes. However, analysts warn that a shift to large-scale aerial attacks or a ground incursion by Israel could spark a return to wider conflict.

Washington revives push for Morocco–Algeria rapprochement

 US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced on October 16 that a peace agreement between Morocco and Algeria, including a resolution of the Western Sahara dispute, could be reached within 60 days. The comment, made during an interview with CBS, surprised many observers who view relations between Rabat and Algiers as among the most entrenched rivalries in the Arab world. Witkoff claimed that the US diplomatic team was “actively facilitating” talks aimed at both normalisation and settlement of territorial issues, signalling a new push by Washington to reshape Maghreb geopolitics.

President Donald Trump has reportedly issued an ultimatum to Algeria to cease its support for the Polisario Front and enter direct talks with Morocco within the same 60‑day window. Trump’s senior advisor for Africa and the Middle East, Massad Boulos, publicly reaffirmed US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and an intention to open a US consulate in the territory.

Algerian officials have rejected what they describe as unacceptable pressure, while Moroccan officials have welcomed the initiative as consolidating the “irreversible” status of Morocco’s sovereignty claims.

Regional and stakeholder impact

At face value, recent reports detailing comments from US officials suggest an imminent breakthrough. In practice, however, the structural obstacles to such a rapid accord are formidable. Algeria severed diplomatic ties with Morocco in 2021, accusing Rabat of espionage and “hostile acts.” The Western Sahara issue, which lies at the heart of the dispute, has resisted decades of mediation, with the two sides locked in incompatible positions: Morocco insists on autonomy under its sovereignty, while Algeria backs the Polisario Front’s demand for self‑determination.

While US activism adds momentum to a frozen conflict, it also risks overpromising. No official track of negotiations has yet been confirmed by either capital, and neither leadership has publicly endorsed a firm timeline. Some conservative voices in Washington and Rabat are also pushing steps – such as labelling the Polisario as a terrorist organisation or drawing down MINURSO (the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) – that could undercut UN‑led diplomacy.

Were such a peace deal to materialise, it would transform North Africa’s strategic landscape. The reopening of borders and revival of economic cooperation could generate tangible benefits, from trade to security coordination. Morocco would emerge strengthened: its autonomy plan, long promoted as the only viable solution, would gain implicit Algerian acknowledgment, validating years of US and European support. Rapprochement could help re‑anchor Algeria in regional diplomacy and ease tensions along its western flank, allowing it to refocus on domestic reform and its fragile Sahelian neighbourhood.

Yet the costs and political calculations are far from trivial. Any appearance of retreat on Western Sahara risks backlash for Algeria’s political and military establishment, as support for the Polisario is a matter of national identity and legitimacy. On the other hand, Morocco’s leadership would likely reject any outcome that does not fully acknowledge its sovereignty over the region. Thus, while US optimism reflects Washington’s desire to showcase a diplomatic win, it may underestimate the nationalist dynamics shaping decision‑making in both capitals.

What’s next

The Polisario Front faces existential uncertainty if a US‑brokered deal is premised on Moroccan sovereignty; designation efforts or a weakened UN role would further marginalise it and risk renewed escalation. Conversely, a calibrated process that preserves the UN framework, sustains MINURSO, and offers credible guarantees on political participation and rights could draw the Polisario back towards negotiations.

European and African stakeholders would likely welcome de‑escalation but remain wary of a process that prioritises speed over substance or sidelines the UN. Algeria’s alignment with parts of the Global South and its security equities in the Sahel mean that the consequences of a deal perceived as coerced could reverberate beyond the Maghreb.

The most plausible near‑term scenario is incremental de‑escalation rather than a comprehensive accord. Moves that sideline the UN or seek maximalist wins are likely to harden positions and prolong the stalemate. Conversely, sustained, coordinated diplomacy has the potential to reopen communication channels, lower tensions, and create space for gradual normalisation. That will take far longer than 60 days.