MENA Strategic Bulletin – US Elections Special Edition

Donald Trump’s approach to the Middle East is likely to evolve in his second term in office, building on the foundations of his previous policies, but with potential shifts in key areas.

What will this mean in practice?

Trump’s first term was marked by a focus on strengthening Israel’s security, confronting Iran with his maximum pressure campaign; and brokering the historic Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab nations. The 2024 Republican Party platform offers little detail on foreign policy – mainly emphasising support for Israel and restoring peace. Trump is expected to remain steadfast in his commitment to Israel and its wars on different fronts in his second term.

However, his broader Middle East strategy may rely less on military action and more on diplomacy. Notably, Trump has expressed an openness to nuclear negotiations with Iran, signalling a potential shift towards a more deal-oriented approach. His transactional relationships with regional strongmen like Egypt’s Al Sisi and Turkey’s Erdoğan will remain central to his strategy, as will reinforcing strong ties with Saudi Arabia and Israel. Trump is also expected to seek to expand the Abraham Accords, encouraging more Arab nations into formal diplomatic and economic relations with Israel.

However, a transactional approach based on dealmaking and economic interest will also ignore the interests of vulnerable populations in the region, sidelining questions of human rights and political freedom while downplaying humanitarian concerns.

Israel-Palestine

Where Trump left off

Trump’s pro-Israel record includes significant policy decisions during his first term: in May 2018, he moved the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and the following year, he recognised Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. He also cut all US funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in 2018.

Donald Trump frequently portrays himself as the strongest supporter Israel has ever had, claiming in a September 5 post on Truth Social that no president has defended Israel or Jewish Americans more than he has. He describes himself as “history’s most pro-Israel president” and asserts that the Jewish community can rely on him. During a speech to the Republican Jewish Coalition this September, Trump criticised the Biden administration for blaming Israel for the October 7 attack, claiming that such an attack would not have occurred had he been in office.

Trump’s running mate, Senator J.D. Vance, has similarly criticised the Biden administration’s approach to Israel, calling its policy “fundamentally incoherent” and advocating for the US to give Israel full autonomy in its military actions against Hamas to “prosecute this war the way they see fit.”

What’s next?

Israel is likely to see Trump’s victory as an opportunity to escalate its military actions and lock in its objectives in the short term, viewing it as a green light to strike Iran and other regional targets before his inauguration in January 2025. Trump’s permissive attitude towards Israel’s military actions also aligns with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent reshuffling of his government following the firing of Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, which may preface a more aggressive phase in the country’s military strategy.

On the issue of Palestinian statehood, Trump was non-committal in the June 2024 presidential debate, stating, “I’d have to see”. His son-in-law Jared Kushner has suggested moving Palestinians to Israel’s Negev desert or Egypt and has highlighted the potential value of Gaza’s “waterfront property”.

On the diplomatic front, Trump’s push for more Arab states to normalise relations with Israel is likely to have Saudi Arabia as its primary focus, a goal the Biden administration has struggled to achieve. At the same time, Trump is expected to further align with Israeli policies that limit Palestinian influence, including cutting humanitarian aid to Gaza and supporting Israel’s recent decision to ban UNRWA. These actions would further isolate Palestinian leadership and diminish prospects for a two-state solution.

Iran

Where Trump left off

During his first term, Trump demonstrated a commitment to imposing stringent sanctions on Iran, a policy he is expected to continue if re-elected. During the Biden administration there has been a rise in Iranian oil exports, which Trump may target through intensified sanctions. However, success would depend on collaboration with third-party countries, such as Malaysia, that have facilitated Iranian exports to China.

Trump has repeatedly criticised the JCPOA, calling it “disastrous” and accusing the deal of funding Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional destabilisation. He took the US out of the agreement in May 2018, reinstating harsher sanctions as part of his maximum pressure strategy. In September 2024, he claimed that Iran was “broke” under his presidency, and that the removal of sanctions under the Biden administration had allowed Tehran to gain access to $300bn, which in turn funded groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Despite these sanctions, US officials, including then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, acknowledged in 2020 that Iran continued to fund proxies like Hezbollah. Trump also claimed that his administration successfully pressured China into ceasing oil purchases from Iran, but while oil sales dropped in 2019, they rose again during his presidency.

What’s next?

The second Trump administration’s policy toward Iran is difficult to predict with certainty. Trump is likely to continue his maximum pressure campaign. He is also highly influenced by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and other regional leaders, who may push for a more aggressive US approach to Iran, including the possibility of military action. The ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, along with Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, have weakened Iran’s position. This situation could present the US with an opportunity to apply additional pressure, particularly in terms of hindering Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

While there is some merit to this argument, it is uncertain whether Trump would fully embrace it. The recent election of a new Iranian president who has expressed a desire for greater engagement with the West might lead Trump to reconsider his stance. Despite accusations that Iranian agents attempted to interfere in the 2024 US election, Trump has indicated that he remains open to negotiating a broad deal with Iran. Trump has also claimed he would have succeeded in bringing Iran into the Abraham Accords had he remained in power, suggesting he may wish to pursue this goal in his second term.

Gulf States

Where Trump left off

Trump has long defended the transactional nature of his relationship with Gulf states, notably resisting calls to cut arms sales to Saudi Arabia following the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

In his first overseas trip as president in 2017, Trump was warmly received in Riyadh and promoted a $110bn arms deal (though the real value of the deal was later brought into question). Additionally, Saudi investments in Trump’s family ventures, such as the $2bn investment in a fund led by Jared Kushner, strengthened ties. However, his approach to human rights abuses was consistently permissive, signalling no intention to apply pressure on Gulf states regarding their domestic policies.

When it came to Gulf defence, Trump’s approach proved erratic. After the September 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities – claimed by the Houthi movement and believed to be backed by Iran – Trump initially expressed readiness for military action but ultimately refrained, citing his reluctance to engage in war. This hesitation frustrated Saudi Arabia and led other Gulf nations to privately question Trump’s reliability as a security partner. While Gulf leaders may still prefer a Trump victory in the 2024 election, it remains uncertain whether his second term would yield the kind of security and diplomatic benefits they hope for.

What’s next?

Trump is expected to continue his transactional relationship with the Gulf, prioritising arms sales, business deals and security cooperation while sidelining more value-based diplomatic concerns like human rights and political freedoms. Any criticism of authoritarian practices will be minimal, and there will be no guarantees of standing by Gulf states in the event of military confrontations.

Instead, his approach will remain focused on economic interests and a rhetoric of counterterrorism, with little emphasis on long-term strategic alliances. For countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this will mean the need to fight for assurances from Trump that he is committed to their defence.

Trump is expected to lift the US ban on LNG exports, which would give Gulf energy producers more clarity about the potential competition they may face from US LNG exports and the regulatory environment for Gulf investments in US energy projects.

However, it’s unclear how Trump will handle the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which offers a tax credit to US hydrogen producers. If Trump eliminates this tax credit, US-produced hydrogen could become less competitive compared to hydrogen from the Gulf, and it could create uncertainty for Gulf national oil companies considering investments in the US hydrogen sector.