MENA Strategic Bulletin

Israeli cabinet votes to support West Bank annexation

On Tuesday, the Israeli cabinet passed a symbolic motion supporting the annexation of the occupied West Bank, reigniting fears of a formal collapse of the two-state framework proposed in the Oslo Accords. Though the measure has no direct legal effect, it is widely seen as a significant political signal from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right coalition that annexation is moving from long-standing ideology to active political agenda.

Originally proposed by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who resides in an illegal Israeli settlement and holds authority over the West Bank’s civil administration, this declarative measure lays the groundwork for future legislative steps. The West Bank, along with Gaza and East Jerusalem, has been under Israeli military occupation since 1967.

In the decades since, the expansion of Israeli settlements deemed illegal under international law has entrenched control over large parts of the territory. Today, more than 500,000 Israeli settlers live among approximately 3m Palestinians in the West Bank. Though not in itself an act of annexation, the vote strengthens a policy trajectory that gained momentum during the first Trump administration and the “deal of the century.”

Stakeholder and regional impact

The international response to the motion has been swift and sharply critical. Jordan’s Foreign Ministry condemned the move “in the strongest terms,” calling it a “blatant violation of international law” and a direct threat to the two-state solution. Spokesperson Sufyan Qudah cited the 2004 International Court of Justice advisory opinion, which declared both the occupation and the settlements illegal.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France intends to recognise a Palestinian state during the UN General Assembly in September. Macron is hoping to pre-empt unilateral Israeli action by giving momentum to a multilateral diplomatic push.

Smotrich and his allies envision the annexation of Area C, the 60% of the West Bank under full Israeli control, as a first step. This territory, though home to around 350,000 Palestinians, is already heavily populated with settlements and subject to Israeli civil administration. Areas A and B, where most Palestinians live, remain under varying degrees of Palestinian Authority control, though that control is increasingly hollow.

The gradual absorption of Area C would not only preclude the establishment of a Palestinian state but would trigger the slow collapse of the Palestinian Authority itself, a development some members of Israel’s governing coalition would welcome.

For years, Israeli policy in the West Bank has been to enact slow and incremental changes designed to avoid sudden backlash while achieving irreversible control. Full annexation in a single step would risk provoking mass resistance. But partial, staged annexation allows Israel to test both international and Palestinian responses without crossing an obvious red line, which is likely to continue to be the policy going forward.

What’s next?

While the cabinet vote was symbolic, its implications are not. It puts annexation squarely back on the political agenda and signals that the current Israeli leadership sees the post-Oslo era as nearing its end.

The return of a US administration sympathetic to maximalist Israeli positions is likely to accelerate the process. Absent strong international deterrents, including concrete diplomatic and economic consequences, Israel will continue to incrementally absorb West Bank territory. Regional actors, particularly Jordan, are expected to resist the move diplomatically, fearing its impact on regional stability.

UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed pays historic visit to Turkey

On July 17, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan concluded a landmark state visit to Turkey at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This marked the first such visit since July 2023 and underscored a continued thaw and deepening cooperation between the two historically fractious neighbours. The leaders co-chaired the inaugural meeting of the UAE-Turkey High-Level Strategic Council. The talks, held at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, focused on expanding cooperation under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in 2023. Discussions centred on enhancing collaboration in trade, industry, technology, renewable energy, food security and defence.

Over four hours of negotiations culminated in seven memoranda of understanding covering tourism, agriculture, pharmaceuticals and defence cooperation. Notably, the Turkish aerospace firm TUSAS and UAE’s Callidus signed a $50bn deal to jointly develop advanced defence technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles, missile systems and satellites.

Stakeholder and regional impact

Turkey and the UAE have a complex history, marked by tensions over Ankara’s past support for the Muslim Brotherhood, designated a terrorist group by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. With Jordan officially outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood earlier this year, the UAE is likely to encourage Turkey to further distance itself from the group. Turkey has rolled back overt Brotherhood support over the years.

Both Turkey and the UAE share converging interests in post-Assad Syria. Following the regime’s collapse in December 2024 and Iran’s diminished regional influence, Ankara and Abu Dhabi are finding common ground in seeking to support Syria’s stabilisation and participate in its reconstruction.

The UAE’s growing economic investments in Syria, including an $800m infrastructure deal at Tartous port, complement Turkey’s political engagement with Ahmed Al Sharaa’s provisional government. Experts note that Turkey and the UAE align on Syria-related policies “almost 90% of the time,” despite lingering differences over groups like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Beyond Syria, the rapprochement reflects a broader regional recalibration. Both countries recognise the imperative to manage their disagreements pragmatically, balancing political differences against expanding economic and security cooperation. Trade between Turkey and the UAE exceeded $15bn in 2024, with ambitious targets to reach $40bn by 2028 under CEPA’s tariff reductions.

What’s next?

As reconstruction progresses in Syria, the UAE and Turkey are likely to deepen their collaboration, positioning themselves as key actors in shaping the country’s future. The defence partnership, underpinned by major joint economic projects, will serve as a key incentive for expanding diplomatic engagement and strengthening bilateral ties. 

Iran affirms continuation of nuclear programme

In the wake of the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has affirmed Tehran’s continued commitment to its nuclear programme. Pezeshkian emphasised that Iran remains “fully prepared for any new Israeli military move” and cast doubt on the viability of the ceasefire that ended the conflict.

The war, which saw direct US military intervention in support of Israel, included targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure intended to degrade Iran’s enrichment capabilities. However, subsequent reports indicated that the attacks may not have been as effective as US rhetoric made them out to be.

Tehran views the programme as being as strategic as ever. “We cannot give up enrichment,” Araghchi said, describing it as a matter of national pride. Iran continues to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and has pledged to notify the agency of the damage assessment once complete.

The conflict appears to have reinforced rather than undermined Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. However, with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) set to expire in October and the threat of a UN sanctions snapback still on the table, the extent of its international cooperation remains undecided. As Iran prepares to meet the UK, France and Germany on Friday in Istanbul, the government is entering a potentially decisive period.

Stakeholder and regional impact

For Iranian officials, the reassertion of their nuclear programme is a direct consequence of Israeli aggression. Tehran views the Israeli strikes as unprovoked and its military response as a calculated retaliation rather than a prelude to a wider war.

Furthermore, there is little indication that the 12-day war has emboldened Iran to pursue further regional escalation. The attacks appear to have strengthened Iran’s internal consensus on national security. Tehran has sent a clear message that while it does not seek war, any renewed aggression will be met in kind.

Among regional actors, there seems to be a tacit recognition that Iran has endured the assault and remains intact both militarily and politically. With the scenario of renewed Israeli strikes on Iran increasingly possible with US support, Iran has asserted it would have no option but to retaliate.

For the US, the situation is increasingly complex. While the Trump administration continues to back Israeli operations, there seems to be little appetite for further direct military action. US domestic sentiment has grown increasingly sceptical of military entanglements abroad, and there is a widening divide between official rhetoric and popular appetite for confrontation with Iran.

During its attack on the Al-Udeid base in Qatar, Iran coordinated with American officials, a striking indication that neither side is seeking direct confrontation. American strikes also did not shut down Tehran’s nuclear programme, which suggests that the US did not want to provoke an escalation of hostilities with Iran.

What’s next?

The upcoming Istanbul talks may offer a narrow opening, but the path forward is uncertain. The UK, France and Germany will be pressing Tehran to re-commit to verifiable nuclear limits or face renewed sanctions. However, with the JCPOA nearing expiration and Iran determined to commit to a system that can protect its national security, especially given the threat of further Israeli attacks, Iran is likely to double down on its nuclear programme.

Meanwhile, reports indicate that Washington has privately cautioned Israel against further unilateral action. Ultimately, the 12-day war has neither ended Iran’s nuclear ambitions nor deterred its strategic posture. If anything, it has clarified the stakes: any future confrontation is likely to unfold within a far more volatile, less forgiving regional context.